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THE GROWTH OF TELEVISION BROADCASTING 
AND STRUCTURAL ALTERATION THROUGH 
SUBSCRIPTION TELEVISION
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
Modern communication was born over 125 years ago—
May 26, 1844, to be exact. On that date, the first success­
ful test of electronic communication was made by sending a 
telegraphic message from Washington to Baltimore. Samuel 
Horse transmitted the famous message, "What God hath wrought," 
over a wire. Later came experiments and improvements that 
brought the telephone, wireless telegraphy, radio, and 
television.
More than ninety years have passed since Bell and 
Watson made the discovery in Boston that electricity could 
be used to transmit not merely coded messages but also the 
human voice. Over seventy years ago Marconi thrilled the 
world by sending radio signals across the Atlantic Ocean.
Much of the human progress that has been made over the 
past century may be attributed to the discoveries of these 
men and many others like them who gave mass communication to 
the world. It is now apparent that modern civilization 
would have been impossible without such communication.
Mass communication implies at least five things:
(1) large audiences, (2) relatively undifferentiated 
audience composition, (3) some form of mechanical repro­
duction, (4) rapid distribution, and (5) low unit cost to 
the consumer.^
Broadcasting is a major component of mass communica?: 
tions. The Federal Communications Commission (hereafter 
referred to as the Commission or the FCC) has defined broad­
casting as "the dissemination of radio signals intended to
2
be received by the general public." Of the several bands 
on the frequency spectrum, only standard amplitude modulation 
(AM) radio (540-1600 kilocycles), frequency modulation (FM) 
radio (88-108 megacycles), and television (Very High Fre­
quency or VHP and Ultra High Frequency or UHF occupying 
channels 2-13 and 14-83, respectively) qualify as
^Sydney W. Head, Broadcasting in America (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1956), p. 77.
2U.S. Congress, Communications Act of 1934, Section 3.
broadcasting. Of course, any radio signal can be received 
with the proper equipment, but only signals from the above 
mentioned channels are "intended" for public reception.
When (radio) broadcasting arrived, the communications 
field was already big business. The newspaper had developed 
the techniques of advertising for financial support, syndi­
cating materials, and large-scale organization. The motion 
picture industry had just gone through its early stages of 
development. And the telephone and telegraph, not them­
selves mass media, had contributed their share to the 
concept of communications. The rapid growth of broadcasting 
may be attributed in large part to the prior experience of 
the other media.^
The Communications Act of 1934
Radio broadcasting began to soar in the early 1900*s. 
As a result of wave piracy,^ offensive advertising, alleged 
monopolistic practices, and other conditions which had 
developed in the unregulated radio industry, the House and 
Senate finally agreed upon a bill which came out of the
3
Head, Broadcasting in America, p. 79.
4
This refers to new transmitters being operated on 
frequencies of existing transmitters resulting in inter­
ference.
1926 Congressional hearings. The Federal Radio Act became 
law on February 23, 1927. Due to its inadequacies. Congress 
anacted the Federal Communications Act (hereafter referred 
to as the Act) on June 19, 1934, which created the FCC and 
gave it the authority to regulate all interstate and foreign 
communication by means of wire or radio.
An outgrowth of a long evolutionary process, the Act, 
amended from time to time, has been in effect for nearly 
four decades. As stated in Section 1, the broad purpose of 
the Act is . . t o  make available, so far as possible, to 
all the people of the United States a rapid, efficient, 
nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication 
service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges. . . .
The Act clearly provides for private ownership and 
management of broadcasting facilities with government regu­
lation for the protection of "the public interest," Although 
the physical apparatus used by broadcasting stations is 
privately owned and managed, this is not true with respect 
to the channels which they employ. Section 301 of the Act 
states that one of the purposes of the Act is "to maintain 
the control of the United States over all the channels of
^U.S. Congress, Communications Act of 1934.
interstate and foreign radio transmission." It is provided 
that such channels may be used for limited periods of time 
under licenses granted by Federal authority, and that no 
such license is to be construed as creating "any right, 
beyond the terms, conditions, and periods of the license.
Radio and television stations broadcasting programs 
to be received by the general public are not considered to 
be "common carriers for hire" as are the telephone and tele­
graph industries. Two characteristics distinguish a common 
carrier from broadcasting: it is a service for which a
charge is made and a subscriber has the prerogative of using 
the service in the manner he chooses. Broadcasting, how­
ever, is a free medium, and aside from station selection, 
the listener or viewer has no direct control over what is 
broadcast.
Congress recognized the field of broadcasting as one
%
of free competition, and to guard against the tendencies 
toward monopoly which had caused Federal regulation, it 
declared in Section 313 of the Act that all the laws of the 
United States relating to unlawful restraints of trade are 
applicable to the manufacture and sale of radio apparatus
^Ibid.
and to broadcasting in general. A violation of any such law
7
may be grounds for revocation of a station license.
That television broadcasting would be regulated by
the Act is provided for in Section 3. "Radio communication
. . .  means the transmission by radio of writing, signs,
8
signals, pictures, and sounds of all kinds. . .
The Coming of Television 
Although the development of television technology 
has taken place over a long period of time, the development 
of television broadcasting has occurred within the past 
fifty years.
Television had its beginnings as far back as 1817, 
when a new substance called selenium was discovered by Jôns 
Berzelius, a Swedish chemist. In 1873, Joseph May found that 
selenium could convert light energy into electrical energy, 
making possible the transmission of pictures by means of an 
electric signal. The principle of scanning was suggested by 
Maurice Le Blanc in 1880; and four years later, Paul Nipkow 
invented the scanning disk by which moving pictures could be
^Ibid.
®Ibid.
converted into electric signals by the use of a selenium 
photo cell.
Ferdinand Braun, using electricity in conjunction 
with television for the first time, introduced the cathode 
ray oscilloscope in 1897. It was perfected in 1907 by Boris 
Rosing, creator of the first electronic picture viewer. In 
1923, Vladimir Zworykin patented the iconoscope, the first 
television camera. Three years later, C. F. Jenkins, an 
American, and John L. Baird, a Scotchman, demonstrated 
electrical transmission of crude black and white silhouettes 
in motion employing mechanical scansion, and thus introduced 
the first practical mechanical television system.
In 1927, the Bell Telephone Company demonstrated the 
practicality of Jenkins' and Baird's system by transmitting 
pictures by wire from Washington, D.C., to New York. By 
1928, there were a few stations experimenting with televi­
sion. Jenkins attempted to exploit the commercial possi­
bilities of television in 1930, but was unsuccessful because 
the mechanical system produced poor images and frequently 
broke down.
A major technological breakthrough came in 1933 when 
Zworykin and Philo Farnsworth, working independently, devel­
oped a method for an all-electronic television system using
8the iconoscope tube. Research ensued to produce a completely 
electronic system which could deliver good images over long 
distances to receivers of a size and price sufficiently 
small to interest consumers.
Leaders were ready for commercial television by 1939 
and Du Mont marketed the first home receivers that year.
In April, 1939, NBC demonstrated their RCA system by broad­
casting a speech of President Franklin D. Roosevelt at the 
opening of the New York World's Fair. A dynamic industry 
which was to have a significant impact on the world was born 
and Fortune Magazine declared, "A long time after the World's 
Fair has become one of grandfather's stories, April 30 will
still be remembered as the day when they formally started
9
television in the United States."
In May, 1941, seven months before the United States 
entered World War II, the FCC authorized commercial tele­
casting, adopting the standards of the National Television 
Systems Committee. The first license was granted to WNBT 
(New York), an RCA-owned station. By mid-1942, there were 
ten stations on the air, but only six continued to provide 
limited service during the War. On April 22, 1942, all
9
Fortune, Apri1-May, 1939, p. 53.
production of television sets came to a halt and during the 
war years less than 10,000 receivers were in use.
There were twelve commercial stations on the air at 
the end of 1946. Sensing potential profits, individuals 
began scrambling for licenses. By 1948, generally regarded 
as the year in which television emerged as a mass medium, 
there were sixteen stations on the air and many n»re either 
under construction or awaiting FCC action. Pour networks—  
NBC, CBS, ABC, and Du Mont— were providing regular service. 
With such a background, and the limited space in the VHP 
spectrum, the FCC ceased licensing new stations on Septem­
ber 30, 1948, and the “freeze" continued for four years, 
until April 14, 1952.^^
After the freeze, differences of opinion existed in 
the United States concerning the future of television. Many 
were confident that television was a child of radio and that 
eventually it would pay its own way because of its appeal to 
both ear and eye. Others argued that it was a "scientific
lOflead, Broadcasting in America, p. 157.
^^Bryce W. Rucker, The First Freedom (Carbondale, 
Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1968),
p. 92.
10
novelty," a "millionaire's toy," which could not survive
12since masses were the lifeblood of radio.
There has never been a doubt regarding the future of 
television in the minds of broadcasting's leaders. It has 
extended man's range of vision and has led him out of the 
dark ages of radio and into the light. Some have hailed it 
as the single most significant force in our society.
Identification and Significance 
of the Economic Problem
Since 1952, the television broadcasting industry, 
aided and regulated by the FCC, has become one of the fastest 
growing industries in America. At times, this growth has 
been complemented by government regulatory efforts. For 
exanple, television certainly would not have been able to 
survive had the wave piracy that existed in the early days 
of radio not been contained by the Communications Act. But 
when regulation has sought to influence the qualitative 
aspect of program diversity, it has not been successful.
In television broadcasting, program diversity is one 
standard by which industry and regulatory performance are 
increasingly evaluated. Program diversity refers to a more
12Orrin E. Dunlap, The Future of Television (New 
York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1942), p. 6.
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varied choice within the framework of television programing 
rather than to a quantitative increase in viewer choice 
(i.e., program duplication).
The number of television stations on the air nas 
increased rapidly during the past two decades, but the ten­
dency has been toward program duplication as more than one 
station has commenced broadcasting in a given market. New 
entrants tend to duplicate the programing of rivals as long 
as the market share they can thereby command exceeds what 
they could otherwise preempt with a new program type. 
Spectrum scarcity prevents an increase in the number of 
stations to the extent necessary for significant progreun 
diversity.
Much of the public criticism of commercial television 
focuses on the relative neglect of programing for minority 
tastes. A substantial portion of the potential television 
audience feels that it is not being catered for and many 
current viewers feel that they are forced to accept a kind 
of second best. The absence of demand prices for particular 
program outputs has left this group relatively helpless in 
its efforts to attain the type of programing it desires.
Such a situation led former FCC chairman Newton F. 
Minow to make a stinging indictment of commercial television.
12
calling it a "vast wasteland." In part he said:
I invite you to sit down in front of your television 
set when your station goes on the air and stay there 
without a book, magazine, n^spaper, profit and loss 
sheet or rating book to distract you— and keep your 
eyes glued to that set until the station signs off.
I can assure you that you will observe a vast 
wasteland.
You will see a procession of game shows, violence, 
audience participation shows, formula comedies 
about totally unbelievable families, blood and 
thunder, mayhem, violence, sadism, murder, western 
bad men, western good men, private eyes, gangsters, 
more violence, and cartoons. And endlessly, 
commercials— many screaming, cajoling, and offend­
ing. And most of all, boredom. True, you will see 
a few things you will enjoy. But they will be very, 
very few. And if you think I exaggerate, try it. 13
FCC regulatory efforts have not had the intended 
effect of program diversity since the profit-maximizing goal 
of broadcasting stations (like other firms) is over-riding 
and programing for minority tastes is not in the profit- 
maximizing interest of commercial television stations. That 
a substantial portion of the population is not adequately 
being served by television implies that the economic welfare 
of society could increase given an appropriate structural 
change.
3^3Quoted in John H. Pennybacker and Waldo W. Braden, 
Broadcasting and the Public Interest (New York; Random 
House, 1969), p. 44.
13
The hypothesis of this study is that program diversity 
in the profit-maximizing television broadcasting industry 
cannot be achieved by government regulation, and that a sig­
nificant improvement in the economic welfare of (actual and 
potential) viewers can be achieved only by complete govern­
ment operation of the industry or by reliance on market 
forces as through subscription television as a supplement to 
commercial television.
Method of Study 
Chapter One has presented a brief history of the 
pre-freeze era of television. In order to facilitate the 
discussion of industry structure (in Chapter Three), a 
description of the background and growth of the industry 
from 1952 to 1970, including an appraisal of the growth in 
number, revenues, expenses, and income of stations and net­
works (the primary components of the industrial structure), 
will be given in Chapter Two. The rapid increase in audience 
size has promoted this growth, and the rapid increase in 
advertising expenditures has financed it. The radio and 
motion picture industries have had to diversii^ in order to 
survive in a world of television, but the latter has not 
been forced to do the same. This is a problem that currently
14
exists in the industry from the standpoint of television's 
requirement to serve the public interest.
Chapter Three will analyze the current economic 
structure of the industry, including a discussion of bar­
riers to station and network entry and a discussion of 
regulatory efforts to alter the structure in an attempt to 
promote diversified programing. The major regulatory 
efforts of the PCC to diver si programing were developing
UHF television, limiting the multiple ownership of stations, 
issuing the Blue Book, and reducing the control of national 
networks over programing by outlawing option time and init­
iating the prime-time access rule. It will be argured that 
if future governmental regulation has the effect of past 
regulation, program diversity will not accrue and therefore 
the public will not be optimally served by television.
The hypothesis calls for an appeal to complete 
government operation of the industry or to market forces to 
solve the problem of program diversity. It will be argued 
from a theoretical standpoint (since empirical evidence is 
lacking) in Chapter Four that of the means available to 
alter the economic structure of the industry, subscription 
television (sometimes called pay-TV) existing along with
15
commercial television appears most desirable since it 
involves less governmental interference, allows the consumer 
to dictate demand (or choice) through market dollar votes, 
and will allow the television broadcasting industry to more 
closely approach an optimum in consumer welfare by promoting 
a more differentiated oligopoly.
In order to further support the hypothesis, an appeal 
will be made to four welfare criteria that have been devel­
oped: the Pareto criterion, the Kaldor criterion, the
Scitovsky criterion, and the Bergson criterion. Marshall's 
consumer surplus theory also offers support for STV as a 
supplement to commercial television.
A summary follows in Chapter Five.
Limitations of the Study 
It is necessary to limit the range of problems 
considered. Commercial television is accepted as the given 
and continuing institutional framework, subject to slight 
modification through subscription television. This by no 
means implies that subscription television will or should 
supersede commercial television. Rather, it will be con­
sidered as a supplement to the existing commercial framework.
16
There is no reason why continuing and increasing 
regulation cannot be accomplished if that is deemed neces­
sary. But there is, both in precedent and in the prejudice 
of the writer, a strong presumption against the public 
utility concept if a reasonable alternative exists and can 
be found. The history and es^erience of public utility 
regulation in this country makes it very clear that such a 
system creates new problems while attempting to solve 
existing ones. Other things being equal, a free market is 
preferable to a regulated one.
It is also necessary to indicate what is included in 
the television broadcasting industry. This study limits 
itself to commercial television broadcasting, both VHP and 
UHF, and excludes educational television. The interest is 
in the problems of production, distribution, and transmis­
sion of programs. The problems of manufacture of equipment 
and construction of stations are excluded. It is the 
activities of stations suid networks that form the core of 
the study, although their relationships with outside groups 
are considered.
A further limitation is the time period, 1952-1970. 
This period was chosen for two reasons. Although television 
broadcasting began before 1952, adequate statistical data
17
are not available prior to that year since the medium was 
no more than an infant and its structure was somewhat 
undefined. Due to the lag between the collection of statis­
tics and their availability, 1970 was chosen as the terminal 
date, although in some cases data for that year were not 
available.
CHAPTER II
THE ECONOMIC GROWTH AND IMPACT OF THE COMMERCIAL 
TELEVISION BROADCASTING INDUSTRY
In his study of the television age, Leo Bogart noted 
some far-reaching changes that have taken place on the Amer­
ican scene to prepare the way for the growth of television.^ 
The expansion of purchasing power and the creation of a 
vast demand for the amenities of life made it possible for 
people to acquire television sets rapidly and on an enormous 
scale. The vast growth of the American econony also made 
possible a huge advertising investment in the new medium 
and provided commercial backing for its high programing 
costs. The concentration of people into metropolitan areas 
made it possible to bring television quickly to great numbers 
of people.
The preceding chapter gave a brief history of the 
pre-freeze television era. The purpose of the present
^Leo Bogart, The Acre of Television (New York:
Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1956), pp. 4-5.
18
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chapter is to describe the rapid growth that has characterized 
the television broadcasting industry since 1952 and the impact 
of that growth. This will facilitate a discussion of the 
industrial structure in Chapter III.
As indicated in Table 1, median family income more 
than doubled between 1952 and 1970, increasing from $3890 to 
$9600. Accompanying this rapid increase in family income has 
been a near tripling of the gross national product between 
the same two years, as revealed in Table 2.
This increased fruitfulness of the American economy 
has made life more pleasant by bringing more of its comforts 
within the budgetary reach of the average family. It has 
also given people more time to spend at their own discretion. 
Until recent times, life for most people in America was a 
steady alternation of work and sleep, with little time for 
entertainment. Today, people are spending fewer and fewer 
hours at work. A century ago the average work week was over 
seventy hours; today it is less than forty. For every waking 
hour the average worker spends at his job each week, he has 
two to spend at his own discretion. Apart from work, life 
is more convenient today. Labor-saving devices have reduced 
the housewife's burdens and her chores are more quickly done.
20
TABLE 1
MEDIAN FAMILY INCOME IN THE UNITED STATES,
1947-1970
Year
Median Family 
Income
Index 
(1947 = 100)
1947 $3031 100
1948 3190 105
1949 3107 102
1950 3319 110
1951 3709 122
1952 3890 128
1953 4233 139
1954 4173 137
1955 4421 146
1956 4783 157
1957 4971 164
1958 5087 167
1959 5417 178
1960 5620 185
1961 5737 189
1962 5956 196
1963 6249 206
1964 6569 216
1965 6957 230
1966 7436 245
1967 7974 263
1968 8632 285
1969 9433 311
1970 9600 317
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of
the Census, Statistical Abstract of the 
United States. Data for 1970 are 
estimated.
21
TABLE 2
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT OF TEE UNITED STATES,
1947-1970
(Billions of Dollars)
Year Gross National 
Product
1947 231.3
1948 259.4
1949 258.0
1950 284.6
1951 328.9
1952 347.0
1953 365.4
1954 363.1
1955 397.4
1956 419.2
1957 442.8
1958 444.2
1959 482.1
1960 504.4
1961 518.7
1962 556.2
1963 583.9
1964 632.4
1965 683.9
1966 749.9
1967 793.5
1968 865.7
1969 929.1
1970 974.1
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Survey
of Current Business.
22
With more people, more money to spend, and more free time, 
television has had a phenomenal growth. ^
Growth of Stations and Networks
The commercial television broadcasting industry has 
been one of the fastest growing industries in the history 
of the United States. On January 1, 1971, there were 682 
commercial television stations on the air, including 503 VHF 
and 179 UHF stations. There were over 100 other stations 
either under construction or not on the air. In less than 
twenty years, the number of stations increased by 531 per 
cent.^ The growth of stations as a function of time is 
shown in Figure 1.
Assuming a direct relationship between general 
economic health and industrial growth, it is interesting to 
note that television's physical growth was over twice that 
of the gross national product between 1952 and 1970. An 
increase in the number of households also provided a stimulus 
for such growth, but only partially accounts for it. From 
1952 to 1970, the number of households increased by 39.7 per
^Ibid.. pp. 5-7.
^See Table 3.
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TABLE 3
COMMERCIAL BROADCASTING STATIONS ON THE AIR 
January 1, 1952-1971
Year
Television Radio
VHF UHF Total AM FM Total
1952 108 0 108 2306 640 2946
1953 120 6 126 2377 612 2989
1954 233 121 354 2451 550 3001
1955 297 114 411 2662 549 3211
1956 344 97 441 2814 536 3350
1957 381 90 471 3024 528 3552
1958 411 84 495 3180 537 3717
1959 433 77 510 3318 571 3889
1960 440 75 515 3456 677 4133
1961 451 76 527 3547 821 4368
1962 458 83 541 3618 894 4512
1963 466 91 557 3760 1050 4810
1964 476 88 564 3854 1126 4980
1965 481 88 569 4044 1205 5249
1966 486 99 585 4065 1730 5795
1967 492 118 610 4121 1904 6025
1968 499 136 635 4190 2124 6314
1969 499 163 662 4265 2330 6595
1970 501 176 677 4292 2468 6760
1971 503 179 682 4343 2624 7967
Source: Television Digest 
1972, p. 75-a.
, Inc *, Television Factbook, 1971-
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FIGURE 1
COMMERCIAL BROADCASTING STATIONS 
ON THE AIR,
JANUARY I, 195Z-I970
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Source: Data from Table 3*
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cent, but the number of television households increased by 
4
289 per cent.
It is axiomatic in economics that growth follows 
demand for service, but in television prime physical growth 
actually preceded demand as measured by homes with sets in 
use. It was 1954 before more than half of the homes in the 
United States had television sets in use. In 1970, that 
proportion had reached 95 per cent. The growth of television 
households as a function of time is shown in Figure 2.
In October, 1970, the average television household 
used television 42 hours and 29 minutes per week, or a little 
over 6 hours per day. During prime time (6:30 p.m. to
5
10:30 p.m.) usage was 14 hours and 26 minutes per week.
This is in contrast to the 1952 weekly figure of 33 hours 
and 44 minutes or less than 5 hours per day.
Total industry revenues in 1970 amounted to $2808.2 
million, total expenses $2354.4 million, leaving $453.8 
million income before federal income taxes. From 1952 to 
1970, the television industry increased its revenues ninefold.
^Computed from data in Television Digest, Inc., 
Television Factbook. Services Volume, 1971-1972, pp. 76- 
77-a. See Table 4.
5
Broadcasting, December 6, 1971, pp. 32-33.
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TABLE 4
PER CENT OP U.S. HOUSEHOLDS WITH 
1952-1970
TELEVISION SETS,
Year Per Cent
1952 34.2
1953 44.7
1954 55.7
1955 64.5
1956 71.8
1957 78.6
1958 83.2
1959 85.9
1960 87.1
1961 88.8
1962 90.0
1963 91.3
1964 92.3
1965 92.6
1966 93.0
1967 93.6
1968 94.6
1969 95.0
1970 95.2
Source; Television Digest, Inc., Television Fact- 
book, 1971-1972, pp. 76-77-a.
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FIGURE 2
PERCEUTAGE OF U.S. HOUSEHOLDS 
WITH TELEVISION SETS,
1952-1970
Per Cent
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Source: Data from Tabl^ 4,
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Although profits in 1970 were somewhat down from the peak 
level in 1969 ($553.6 million), between 1952 emd 1970 profits 
increased over eightfold.® The 1970 profit level provided a 
rather healthy profit-to-tangible-property rate of almost 
62 per cent. This rate for 1969 was approximately 75 per 
cent.
The (arithmetic) average profit among the 677 stations 
(which reported financial data to the FCC) appears to give 
each a sizeable gain. But the arithmetic mean does not pro­
vide an accurate measure because of skewness in the distri­
bution of earnings. The three network corporations along 
with their 15 owned-and-operated stations earned $167.5
million, leaving $286.4 million to be divided among the
7
other 662 stations. The e3q>lanation for such high profit 
rates accruing to the network corporations stems in large 
part from their control over television programing and 
significant barriers to entry into networking. Such control 
and FCC action to limit this will be discussed in the 
following chapter.
Measuring the significance of stations versus networks 
by the percentage of total industry revenues that each
C
See Table 5 and Figure 3.
7
See Tables 6 and 7 and Figures 4 and 5.
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TABLE 5
TELEVISION STATION AND NETWORK REVENUES,
EXPENSES, AND INCOMES,*
1952-1970
(Millions of Dollars)
Year Revenues Expenses ♦♦Incomes
1952 324.2 268.7 55.5
1953 432.7 364.7 68.0
1954 593.0 502.7 90.3
1955 744.7 594.5 150.2
1956 896.9 707.3 189.6
1957 943.2 783.2 160.0
1958 1030.0 858.1 171.9
1959 1163.9 941.6 222.3
1960 1268.6 1024.5 244.1
1961 1318.3 1081.3 237.0
1962 1486.2 1174.6 311.6
1963 1597.2 1254.0 343.2
1964 1793.3 1377.7 415.6
1965 1964.8 1516.9 447.9
1966 2203.0 1710.1 492.9
1967 2275.4 1860.8 414.6
1968 2520.9 2026.1 494.8
1969 2796.2 2242.6 553.6
1970 2808.2 2354.4 453.8
♦Revenues are amounts received by stations and net­
works from all broadcast sources, including time, 
talent, and programs.
♦♦Before Federal income tax.
Source: Summaries of financial data compiled annually
by the FCC, 1952-1970; Television Digest, Inc.,
Television Factbook, 1970-1971, p. 48-a.
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FIGURE 3
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TABLE 6
TELEVISION STATION REVENUES, EXPENSES, AND INCOMES,*
1952-1970
(Millions of Dollars)
Year — - ■ Revenues Expenses Incomes**
1952 144.0 98.4 45.6
1953 201.0 151.0 50.0
1954 286.3 232.5 53.8
1955 370.0 288.5 81.5
1956 454.6 350.4 104.2
1957 475.3 386.0 89.3
1958 513.3 418.4 94.8
1959 587.8 453.4 134.4
1960 627.9 479.0 148.9
1961 643.0 493.0 150.0
1962 732.0 531.8 200.2
1963 776.9 569.9 207.0
1964 864.6 605.5 259.1
1965 941.0 654.7 286.3
1966 1036.7 730.6 306.1
1967 1058.8 804.3 254.5
1968 1212.9 897.0 316.0
1969 1328.9 1001.3 327.6
1970 1351.1 1064.7 286.4
*Revenues are amounts received by stations from all 
broadcast sources, including time, talent, and pro­
grams.
♦♦Before Federal income tax.
Source: Summaries of financial data compiled annually
by the FCC, 1952-1970; Television Digest, Inc.,
Television Factbook, 1970-1971, p. 48-a.
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FIGURE 4
TELEVISION STATION
REVENUES. EXPENSES, AND INCOMES,
1952-1970
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TABLE 7
TELEVISION NETWORK REVENUES, EXPENSES, AND INCOMES,*
1952-1970
(Millions of. Dollars)
Year Revenues Expenses Incomes♦♦
1952 180.2 170.3 9.9
1953 231.7 213.7 18.0
1954 306.7 270.2 36.5
1955 374.0 306.0 68.0
1956 442.3 356.9 85.4
1957 467.9 397.2 . 70.7
1958 516.7 439.7 77.0
1959 576.1 488.2 87.9
1960 640.7 545.5 95.2
1961 675.3 588.3 87.0
1962 754.2 642.8 111.4
1963 820.3 684.1 136.2
1964 928.7 772.2 156.5
1965 1023.8 862.2 161.6
1966 1166.3 979.5 186.8
1967 1216.6 1056.5 160.1
1968 1307.9 1129.2 178.8
1969 1467.3 1241.3 226.1
1970 1457.1 1289.6 167.5
♦Revenues are amounts received by networks from all 
broadcast sources, including time, talent, and progreuns.
♦♦Before Federal income tax.
Source: Summaries of financial data compiled annually
by the FCC, 1952-1970; Television Digest, Inc.,
Television Factbook, 1970-1971, p. 48-a.
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FIGURE S
TELEVISION NETWORK
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receives, it appears that the two groups have been almost 
equally significant since the beginning of television, 
dividing total revenues approximately in half.
Excluding networks and their owned-and-operated 
stations, average station revenues climbed from $1.55 million 
in 1952 to $2.01 million in 1970, but average station profits 
during that period remained about the same at approximately 
$.5 million. The rapid entry into the industry since 1952 
partially accounts for its constant average profitability. 
Even so, there is dispersion in profits. Established sta­
tions in major markets have become more profitable over the 
years, but newer UHF stations have experienced losses. 
According to Table 21, while 82.9 per cent of the VHF sta­
tions reported profits in 1969, only 35.2 per cent of the
  Q
UHF stations reported profits that year.
In general, revenues, expenses, and profits of the 
industry have had a phenomenal growth rate. Expenses 
exceeded revenues, making the industry unprofitable, between 
1948 and 1950. Since 1950, the industry has not had an 
unprofitable year, although in 1957, 1961, 1967, and 1970 
profits fell from the level of the preceding year. Like
®This so-called "UHF problem" will be discussed in 
more detail in the following chapter. Table 21 is on p. 94.
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other service industries, the television broadcasting 
industry is vulnerable to slumps in the economy,®
As of December 31, 1970, the industry had invested 
approximately $1.5 billion in tangible broadcast property.
Of this amount, only $,3 billion had been invested by the 
networks and their owned-and-operated stations. The remain­
ing $1,2 billion was invested by the other 671 television 
stations,
The industry employed 51,452 full-time and 6,973 
part-time persons at the end of 1970, Approximately 23 per 
cent of these were employed by the three networks, and 77 
per cent were employed by the 682 television stations,
Growth of Advertising
The ultimate products of a commercial television 
station are the jointly supplied entertainment (or informa­
tion) program and advertising message. These are jointly
9
Economic theory suggests that the percentage of a 
country's total output comprised of services increases with 
the level of development. In the United States, the service 
component accounts for almost 43 per cent of personal con­
sumption expenditures, according to the U.S. Department of 
Commerce.
^®See Table 8.
^^See Table 9.
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TABLE 8
INVESTMENT IN TANGIBLE BROADCAST PROPERTY OF 
TELEVISION NETWORKS AND 686 TELEVISION STATIONS 
AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1970
Category
Number
of
Stations
Original Cost
Original Cost 
Minus 
Depreciation
3 National 
Networks
—— $ 217,554,000 $118,895,000
Network Owned 
and Operated 
Stations
15 78,693,000 34,434,000
Other Television 
Stations
VHF
UHF
491
180
1,000,614,000
200,450,000
458.811.000
123.257.000
Total 686 $1,497,311,000 $739,397,000
Source: FCC, Television Broadcast Financial Data, 1970,
September 7, 1971.
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TABLE 9
NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES OF NETWORKS AND 
682* TELEVISION STATIONS, AS OF 
DECEMBER 31, 1970
Category Full-time Part-time Total
3 National Networks 10,873 2,324 13,197
15 Network Owned and 
Operated Stations
4,436 254 4,690
Other Television . _
Stations
VHF (491) 30,686 3,589 34,275
UHF (176) 5,457 806 6,263
Total 51,452 6,973 58,425
. . . .  - .
*Does not include 4 UHF stations that ceased operations 
prior to December 31, 1970.
Source: FCC, Television Broadcast Financial Data. 1970,
September 7, 1971.
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exchanged in a barter market for viewer time. In a separate 
dollar market, the advertiser then pays the station for the 
viewer time, approximately in proportion to its volume and 
with relation to the number and duration of advertising 
messages.
Time is a heterogeneous product of the industry. Its 
value varies from station to station, day to day, and hour 
to hour, and is dependent upon the use to which it is put in 
conjunction with competing programs on other stations.
The station thus views the program as a means to 
attract an audience and therefore the advertising dollar.
The advertiser considers the program as merely a vehicle to 
place his good or service in the mind of the viewer, hope­
fully with the effect of increasing the demand and/or 
decreasing the elasticity of demand for the advertised 
product. To the viewer, the advertising message may be 
informational, or it may be a negative economic good which 
he must "consume" in order to obtain the entertainment 
program.
When the latter is true, advertising is criticized as 
being wasteful. The amount of advertising supplied is exces­
sive relative to the demand because it is provided at a zero 
price to potential buyers while the cost of (the negative
40
economic good) advertising is positive to society. Since 
the amount of advertising that would be demanded at a posi­
tive price (or at a zero price, if provided as a single 
good) is less than the amount that advertisers should provide 
to maximize their profits, advertising is jointly supplied 
with television programing. Ultimately, the advertising and 
^program expense is borne by the consumer, who must pay a 
higher price for advertised goods. The result is that con­
sumers have more advertising foisted off on them than they 
would be willing to purchase in a separate market for adver- 
tixing services.
A major fault with such jointly supplied services is 
dthat one may enjoy the entertainment which the advertiser 
-Supports without necessarily buying the product being adver­
tised. Dn the other hand, he may purchase a produce 
advertised on a program that he does not watch, and thus pay 
more than his fair share for the good. The result is that a 
siibsidy accrues to those who derive satisfaction from tele­
vision service. The subsidy comes from the higher prices on 
advertised products paid by minority groups who are not 
catered for on commercial television.
Hadio's successful use of advertising as the major 
source of revenue set the precedent for television. The
41
television commercial was born and broadcast before most 
Americans knew that television itself existed. On July 1, 
1941, NBC's New York channel, WNBT, displayed the time on a 
Bulova clock at 2:30 p.m. Then it telecast a baseball game 
from Ebbets Field. At 6:45 that evening, Sunoco gasoline 
sponsored a newscast with Lowell Thomas, and later that 
evening Lever Brothers Company (today's eighth largest tele­
vision advertiser) presented "Uncle Jim's Question Bee," 
with a commercial for Spry. Proctor and Gamble (today's 
number one advertiser) retaliated with Ralph Edward's "Truth 
or Consequences," and before signing off, WNBT showed the 
correct time from Bulova again. There were an estimated 
4500 viewers at that time. The station collected three 
hundred and twenty-two dollars in commercial fees— a heavy
loss for the day, but no cause for great concern since the
12"pot of gold" was clearly visible on the horizon.
Today, advertising provides the financial support and 
many of the stimuli of the industry. The financial support 
of advertising goes beyond the purchase of time; it provides 
either the programs or the cost, and pays the cost of the
12
Harold Mehling, The Great Time-Killer (Cleveland: 
The World Publishing Company, 1962), pp. 188-189.
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talent necessary to produce, direct and enact all commercial 
programs.
Three kinds of advertising may be distinguished: 
network, national non-network, and local. The first is 
defined as advertising done through the network organizations. 
It is usually nationwide in character and is used solely by 
producers of products or services having a widespread market. 
National non-network advertising (often called spot advertis­
ing) is generally done by the same class of advertisers, but 
is placed directly with stations, generally through adver­
tising agencies. Local advertising is defined in terms of 
the advertiser's product, which for local advertising must 
be restricted to a single metropolitan area.
In 1970, advertisers spend a total of $3,660 million 
dollars on television advertising alone. Approximately half 
of this amount ($1,715 million) was for network advertising 
and the other half for spot and local advertising ($1,945 
million). Of the total amount of advertising expenditures 
in the United States in 1970 ($19,715 million), approximately 
18.6 per cent went to television. The only medium receiving 
larger expenditures than television was the newspaper, 
accounting for 29.7 per cent of total advertising es^endi- 
tures in 1970. (See Table 10.)
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TABLE 10
ADVERTISING EXPENDITURES IN THE UNITED STATES 
BY MEDIUM AND TYPE OF COVERAGE, 1970
(Millions of Dollars)
Medium Expenditures*
Television $3660.0
Network 1715.0
Spot 1255.0
Local 690.0
Radio 1278.0
Network 58.0
Spot 355.0
Local 865.0
Newspapers 5850.0
National 1040.0
Local 4810.0
Magazines 1321.0
All Other 7606.0
♦These are total expenditures by advertisers, 
not merely receipts by media.
Source: Television Digest, Inc., Television Fact-
booTc. 1971-1972, p. 73-1.
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If one examines Table 11, it becomes apparent that 
of the top four media (television, radio, newspapers, and 
magazines), television received the smallest per cent of 
advertising in 1952, That year, newspapers led with 34,6 
per cent of all advertising expenditures, followed by radio 
with 9,5 per cent, followed by magazines with 8,6 per cent, 
and then television with 7,1 per cent. By 1970, the per­
centages of all but television had declined: newspapers
down to 29,2 per cent, radio down to 6.5 per cent, magazines 
down to 6.7 per cent, and television up to 18,6 per cent.
In fact, the percentage for television more than doubled 
between 1952 and 1970,
All ten of television's top-10 advertisers for 1970 
increased their television budgets over 1969, according to 
the Television Bureau of Advertising, This represents a 
strong confidence in the selling power of television, says 
Norman E, Cash, president of the Bureau.
At a time when top management scrutinizes every 
dollar spent in advertising, it is highly signifi­
cant that many corporations chose to increase their 
commitment to television. That's the finest evidence 
we have of television's continuing ability to market 
goods and services with maximum efficiency,13
p, 39.
^^Quoted in Television/Radio Age, May 17, 1971,
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TABLE 11
ADVERTISING EXPENDITURES BY MEDIUM, 
SELECTED YEARS, 1952-1970
(Millions of Dollars)
Year Amount & 
Per Cent
Television Radio Newspapers Magazines
1952
Amount $ 509 $ 679 $2743 $ 616
Per Cent 7.1 9.5 34.6 8.6
1954
Amount 804 565 2695 668
Per Cent 9.8 7.0 33.0 8.2
1958
Amount 1360 616 3120 770
Per Cent 13.3 6.0 30.6 7.6
1962
Amount 1754 709 3794 973
Per Cent 14.2 5.8 31.0 7.9
1966
Amount 2784 1001 4895 1291
Per Cent 16.7 6.0 29.5 7.8
1970
Amount 3660 1278 5850 1321
Per Cent 18.6 6.5 29.7 6.7
Source: McCann-Erickson, Inc., Printer's Ink, Marketing/
Communications'.
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TABLE 12
TELEVISION TIME SALES
1952-1970
(Millions of Dollars)
Year Network Spot Local Total
1952 185.5 80.2 65.2 330.9
1953 232.8 124.3 88.5 445.6
1954 317.1 176.8 120.1 614.0
1955 411.0 222.4 149.8 783.2
1956 502.8 281.2 174.2 958.2
1957 538.7 300.5 174.0 1013.2
1958 586.3 345.2 181.3 1112.8
1959 625.0 424.2 200.6 1249.8
1960 688.9 459.2 215.8 1363.9
1961 749.8 480.1 199.6 1429.5
1962 830.6 554.1 227.9 1612.6
1963 882.8 616.0 240.8 1739.6
1964 972.0 710.8 275.7 1958.5
1965 1054.4 785.7 302.9 2143.0
1966 1196.9 871.7 346.4 2415.0
1967 1243.9 871.7 365.3 2480.9
1968 1302.8 998.0 452.5 2753.3
1969 1435.7 1108.1 519.0 3062.8
1970 1465.0 1100.0 550.0 3115.0
Source: Television Digest, Inc., Television Factbook,
1971-1972, p. 71-a.
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TABLE 13
TOP-TWENTY TELEVISION ADVERTISERS, 1970
Advertiser Amount
Per Cent 
of Total
Cumulative
Percentage
1. Proctor & Gamble Co. $179,276,100 4.89 4.89
2. General Foods Corp. 93,897,800 2.56 7.45
3. Colgate-Palmolive Co. 83,381,700 2.28 9.73
4. Bristol-I^ers Co. 80,407,700 2.20 11.93
5. Am Home Prod. Corp. 67,202,400 1.84 13.77
6. R.J. Reynolds Ind.,Inc.66,821,400 1.83 15.60
7. Warn.-Lamb't.Phar.Co. 64,066,800 1.82 17.42
8. Lever Bros. Co. 59,450,500 1.62 19.04
9. Sterling Drug, Inc. 54,263,100 1.48 20.50
10. Phillip Morris, Inc. 48,177,600 1.32 21.84
11. Gillette Co. 43,800,100 1.20 23.04
12. General Mills, Inc. 42,090,800 1.15 24.19
13. General Motors Corp. 41,935,500 1.14 25.33
14. Ford Motor Co. 38,922,400 1.06 26.39
15. Miles Labs., Inc. 38,545,100 1.05 27.44
16. Sears,Roebuck & Co. 34,226,200 .94 28.38
17. Kellogg Co. 33,506,000 .91 29.29
18. Coca-Cola Co. 32,473,200 .89 30.18
19. Kraftco Corp. 31,523,900 .86 31.04
20. Loews Theaters, Inc. 31,468,000. -S6 31.90
Source: Televieiori/Radio Acre', May 17, 1971, p. 39.
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Twenty-four per cent of daytime television is 
commercial, and thirteen per cent of prime time is commercial. 
This compares favorably with other media. The figure is 
twenty-five per cent in radio, sixty per cent in newspapers, 
and forty-five to fifty per cent in consumer magazines. Such 
commercial densities would probably be very unattractive in 
television because it is more demanding from the point of 
view of the audience,
The Economic impact o'f Television
From the data on advertising expenditures in the United 
States found in Table 11, it is obvious that television has 
had a financial impact on all media. In the words of Noran 
E, Kersta, former manager of the television department of 
NBC,
Television has sound. It adds sight and motion to 
sound, and herein departs from all other communication 
and advertising media. It adds spontaneity or imme­
diacy; it takes its audience right to the actual scene 
of action. It adds life itself to a broadcast program,^
Ten people, five men and five women, were asked which 
they would surrender first, hearing or sight, if it became
^^Stanley T, Donner, The Meaning of Commercial Tele­
vision (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1967), p, 37,
^^Quoted in Orrin E, Dunlap, The Future of Television 
(New York; Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1942), p, 12,
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necessary to choose. All replied that they would first 
surrender hearing. Psychologists state that the ratio of 
effectiveness between sight and hearing is about 9 to 1.
This perhaps explains why the ten people chose to keep their 
sight.
Many travelers who twenty years ago had never seen a 
television set today will not stay in a hotel room overnight 
unless they are provided with one. As indicated in Table 4* 
less than 5 per cent of the households in the United States 
do not have a television set.
In 1969, Roper Research Associates reported its 
findings on public attitudes toward television and other mass 
media based on a 1959-1968 study. The study revealed that 
most people surveyed stated that they depended on television 
as their source of most news and information.^^ In his 1963 
study, Gary Steiner found that the majority of people sur­
veyed considered television and newspapers as the most
17important source of news.
One FCC Commissioner recently estimated that by the 
time a five year old enters kindergarten, he has spent more
^^Newspapers were second as a primary news source and 
radio was third.
^^Gary Steiner, The People Look at Television (New 
York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1963).
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time in front of a television set than the average college
student spends in class during his entire four years of col- 
X8
lege. A recent issue of Newsweek says that by the time the 
average American reaches 65 years of age, he will have spent 
nine of those years watching television-
In these statements are found the power and importance 
of television. It extends man's range of vision— a sense he 
cherishes beyond reproach— and brings him closer to the world 
around him. It emerges in the 1970's as the number one 
communications medium.
Few economic sectors have not been affected in some 
way by television. In many cases, the effect has been 
positive; in others, it has been adverse. Since it would be 
impossible to study the impact of television on every eco­
nomic sector, two sectors which have been most affected, the 
radio and motion picture industries, were chosen. Television 
has had a different impact on radio than on motion pictures. 
The latter actually experienced declining receipts; radio 
has suffered only from a decreased rate of growth. Radio 
revenues have actually increased during the past 20 years
^^Broadcasting, December 23, 1968, p. 41.
^^Newsweek, March 17, 1969, p. 80.
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(except for 1953-1954 during the general recession).
Personal consumption expenditures on motion picture admis­
sions declined about 25 per cent between 1952 and 1970,^® 
but expenditures of advertisers on radio increased by more 
than 50 per cent during the same p e r i o d . I n  the next two 
sections, television's impact on each of these industries 
will be discussed in more detail.
The Impact on the Radio Industry
A look at Table 3 reveals that the total number of
radio stations (AM and PM) has increased from 2946 in 1952
to 7967 in 1970. However, the rate of growth has decreased
during this time period. The competition of television is
principally but not solely the cause, since currently AM
licenses are frozen due to a lack of spectrum space.
Every year more radio receivers than television sets
are sold. In 1970, 16,406,000 radio receivers were produced
22in the United States. This includes table models, clock 
radios, portable sets, and auto radios. In the same year,
^^Time., November 8, 1971, p. 79.
^^Television Digest, Inc., Television Factbook, 
Services Volume, 1971-1972, p. 72-a.
^^Ibid.. p. 74-a.
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only 9,482,938 television sets were produced, including
23monochrome and color. However, the total value of the 
television sets produced far ceded that of the radios.
What basically has happened is that radio has received 
a smaller and smaller percentage of the advertising dollar as 
television has grown, in part an effect of shorter listening 
hours and thus an increasing cost per thousand to the adver­
tiser, and in part due to the lower effectiveness of the 
radio commercial. Based on the data in Table 11, radio's 
percentage of the advertising dollar fell from 9.5 per cent 
in 1952 to 6.5 per cent in 1970.
Rolf B. Meyersohn summarizes four differences in 
attitudes towards radio and t e l e v i s i o n . T h e  first is the 
change in apparent interest and information. A l a r n u m b e r  
of Americans know what is televised— they read about it in 
newspapers and W  Guide and talk about it with friends. This 
inclusion of television programing as part of cur ent events 
was once true for radio. Today, however, people know rela­
tively little about radio programing. For example, Meyersohn
^^ïbid., p. 76-a.
24
Rolf B. Meyer sohn, "What We Itoow 7 Lout Audiences,* 
Journal of Broadcasting. I (Summer, 1957), pp. 220-225.
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notes that six months after NBC's inception of one of the 
more spectacular and successful radio ventures of recent 
years, "Monitor," a study found that more than 50 per cent 
of the radio-owning population had never heard of it. And 
"Monitor" is not on for an hour or so, but two full days 
every weekend.
A second difference in attitudes towards radio and 
television is called audience loyalty. As television began 
to reach more and more people, they deserted radio, especi­
ally in the evening hours.
A third difference is in attentiveness. While 
television receives the undivided attention of its audience, 
radios are located in places where people are likely to be 
doing other things— driving, on their way to bed, preparing 
supper, visiting, etc. Radio is completely dependent on 
what people are doing and on whether it happens to be conven­
ient to listen. On the other hand, time is made for viewing 
television. In general, radio has become a "companion medium, " 
a background for other things.
A fourth difference gives a clue to the reasons for 
the other three. In the past, radio was regarded as a major 
source of entertainment. Television has taken over this
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role, and radio is used in its companion role or as a source 
of a specific program such as news or sports.
Thus, in terms of interest, loyalty, attentiveness, 
and what might be called a media "enthusiasm, " television 
certainly wins out over radio.
Radio networks have been more adversely affected than 
individual stations. Radio network time sales fell from 
$102,528 thousand in 1952 to $50,999 thousand in 1969. How­
ever, spot and local radio time sales increased from $370,623
25thousand to $1,149,500 thousand between these two years.
The gap left by national advertisers converting to television
has been partially filled by local and regional advertisers.
There are two major reasons that radio networks have remained
in business in spite of continuing losses.
Three of the four radio networks are co-owned by 
26television networks. Profits from the television networks, 
their owned-and-operated radio and television stations, and 
other interests have offset the losses of the radio networks. 
Secondly, a radio network which relinquished its service 
would risk the displeasure of the FCC, which has considered 
radio networking "in the public interest."
^®See Table 14 and Figure 7.
^^Mutual Broadcasting System is the exception.
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TABLE 14
RADIO TIME SALES, 1952-1969 
(Thousands of Dollars)
Year
National Network Total
Amount
Per Cent 
Change From 
Preceding 
Year
*
Amount
Per Cent 
Change From 
Preceding 
Year
1952 $102,528 -10.0 $ 473,151 3.6
1953 92,865 — 9*4 477,206 0.9
1954 78,917 -15.0 451,330 -5.4
1955 60,268 -23.6 456,481 0.7
1956 44,839 -25.6 491,707 7.7
1957 47,951 6.9 537,664 9.3
1958 42,786 - 8.7 541,665 0.9
1959 35,663 -23.4 555,732 6.7
1960 35,026 - 1.7 591,863 6.5
1961 35,837 2.3 617,242 -0.8
1962 37,326 4.2 665,249 7.8
1963 41,797 12.0 711,741 7.0
1964 43,783 4.8 763,768 7.3
1965 44,602 1.9 827,782 8.4
1966 47,200 5.8 911,979 10.2
1967 47,600 0.8 966,000 5.9
1968 46,800 - 1.7 1,076,300 11.4
1969 50,900 8.8 1,200,400 11.5
*This includes network, spot, and local.
Source: Television Digest, Inc., Television Factbook. 1971-
1972, p. 71-a.
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FIGURE 7
RADIO TIME SALES 
NETWORK AND TOTAL, 
1952-1969
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Radio networks suffered because their major programs 
were concentrated in prime evening hours and the content of 
these programs made them more vulnerable to television com­
petition than the typical non-network program. Television 
may enjoy an absolute advantage over radio in the presenta­
tion of all types of programing, but its comparative advantage
lies in the programing area that was formerly tlie province of 
27network radio. Radio programing has thus shifted to the 
area of radio's least comparative disadvantage relative to 
television: recorded music and news. Formats of radio
stations today typically feature one type of music, with one 
or two interruptions per hour for news.
This music-and-news format exploits radio's major 
advantage over television— the listener need not devote his 
full attention to the set. Radio has been moved out of the 
living room and into the bedroom, kitchen, bathroom, outdoors, 
and automobile, where the listener is typically doing more 
than just listening. Radio has survived in spite of tele­
vision because it has exploited its comparative advantage.
27predric Stuart, "The Effects of Television on the 
Motion Picture and Radio Industries," (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Columbia University, 1960), p. 148.
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and its financial comeback in recent years can be noted in 
Table 14.
The Impact on the Motion Picture Industry
During television's infancy, the motion picture 
industry considered it only a fad whose novelty would soon 
disappear. The small image, inferior programing, and abun­
dance of commercial announcements were viewed as substantial 
inferiorities which would result in the family returning to 
the theater. However, with revenues steadily declining and 
the closing down of hundreds of theaters,^® the need for 
action by the motion picture industry became obvious.
Several methods were tried in an attempt to rescue the 
industry. Studios began to rid themselves of the heavy fixed 
costs of physical plant, stars, producers, writers, direc­
tors, etc., and began to "rent" such resources. This, 
however, led to a rise of many independent producers since 
capital costs had been substantially reduced.
Product improvement was tried. Spectacular pictures—  
too big for television— were filmed, color was more widely 
used, the screen was made larger, three-dimension filming was 
added, and stereophonic sound was used.
^®See Table 15.
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TABLE 15
MOTION PICTURE THEATERS AND RECEIPTS, 
SELECTED YEARS, 1948-1967
Year
Number
of
Theaters
Receipts
(Thousands)
1948 18,509 $1,613,728
1954 18,491 1,407,151
1958 16,354 1,171,783
1963 12,652 1,062,732
1967 12,187 1,293,035
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, 
Census, Census of Business, 
1958, 1963, and 1967.
Bureau of the 
1948, 1954,
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Although they held back for several years, producers 
found the ultimate solution in selling backlogs of old films 
to networks and stations. Networks found the films to be 
very acceptable to the public, and independent stations 
found them to be an effective substitute for affiliation.
But theater owners violently disapproved. Providing
films to television was improving the product that kept
audiences away from the theater. Some of the losses have
been recovered by higher box office prices, which have more
29than tripled in the past 25 years, and by projecting com­
mercial advertising between films.
The theater does have some advantages over television. 
The audience is subjected to less distraction (from commer­
cials and household activités). The screen is bigger, and 
special effects, such as fires and monsters, are possible on 
a larger scale. The production effort can be greater since 
potential gross revenue is larger. This last feature will 
be discussed in more detail in Chapter Four as it pertains to 
subscription television.
It is evident from Table 15 that theater owners have 
experienced losses due to television. The number of theaters
29
Time., November 8, 1971, p. 79.
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in the United States fell from 18,509 in 1948 to 12,187 in
1967. This is in spite of the fact that the population of
the country increased from 146,730,000 to 197,864,000 during 
30those years, a fact which makes the decline even more sig­
nificant. That motion picture production and distribution 
services fared somewhat better is evident in Table 16, and 
much of this success can be attributed to the sale of films 
to television networks and stations.
In the motion picture industry, the individual theater 
owners have been more adversely affected than the central 
producers, while in radio, the networks have experienced more 
substantial losses than the individual stations. In both 
cases, the impact of television has been less adverse where 
the particular sector has been able to exploit its compara­
tive advantage in the face of increased competition.
30U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract 
of the U.S., 1970.
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TABLE 16
MOTION PICTURE PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION 
ORGANIZATIONS AND RECEIPTS 
SELECTED YEARS, 1954-1967
Year Number
Receipts
(Thousands)
1954 2,352 $ 944,638
1958 3,191 1,249,017
1963 3,729 1,520,079
1967 4,565 2,183,086
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, 
Census, Census of Business,
Bureau of the 
1954, 1958, 1963,
and 1967.
CHAPTER III
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF THE COMMERCIAL 
TELEVISION BROADCASTING INDUSTRY
The commercial television broadcasting industry in 
the United States is composed of two internal sectors, 
stations and networks, and two external sectors, advertisers 
and audiences. Although the government is not a major com­
ponent of the industry, it is a significant part of the 
environment of the industry, and its power is apparent from 
the volumes of publications, decisions, and orders that have 
been issued by the FCC.
The preceding chapter discussed the rapid growth of 
the major sectors of the industry in the post-freeze era and 
the impact of this growth. An intricate economic structure 
has evolved out of such rapid growth and problems in altering 
that structure for improved television service have resulted. 
The purpose of the present chapter is to discuss the current 
economic structure of the industry and to show that altering
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that structure through regulatory efforts will not have the 
desired effect of promoting diversified programing.
"The Structure of Stations and Networks 
Certain characteristics concerning the nature of the 
economic structure need to be mentioned at this point.
First, the industry is one of private enterprise, conducted 
for profit. This pro fit-making aspect overrides all other 
aspects, and all services which television provides must be 
considered in this light. Broadcasting is not a common 
carrier and it is not a public utility. Such industries, 
although profit-making, are subject to rigorous governmental 
restrictions as to capital investment, rates of return, and 
public responsibility for service to all who desire it.
These restrictions have not been applied to broadcasting.
Second, television is primarily an entertainment 
medium and secondarily a medium for news and information. 
Finally, television in the United States is not used as an 
instrument to implement government policy. It has been sub­
ject to relatively mild control from the government, much of 
which has been prompted by broadcasters themselves.
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Television Stations
The basic units of the industry are the individual 
television stations, for they alone control the use of time. 
Stations operate under licenses granted by the FCC for three- 
year periods to applicants whose legal, technical, and finan­
cial qualifications, program plans, past experience and 
involvement in the community, appear to qualify them to serve 
"the public interest."
One major aspect of the public interest with which the 
FCC is concerned is that of "prograuQ diversity" in terms of 
cultural, social, political, and economic viewpoints 
expressed. In implementing program diversity, the Commission 
has sought to:
(1) Diversify station ownership through ceilings 
on multiple station ownership and rules on 
cross-channel mergers;
(2) Fortify licensee independence by rules governing 
affiliation contracts and criteria to be employed 
in renewing broadcast licenses;
(3) Encourage the entry of local residents as opposed 
to outsiders unacquainted with community needs in 
order to promote programing of local interest;
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(4) Maintain competition among different components 
of the industry.
There are sometomes conflicts between policies to strengthen 
the structural conditions (ownership diversification, com­
petition) that facilitate program diversity, and those that 
promote the efficiency, stability, and growth of the station 
and network resources needed for the desired programing. ^
Much of this chapter will deal with that conflict.
At the end of 1970, there were 503 VHP stations and 
179 UHF stations for a total of 682 commercial television 
stations in the United States. Of these, 595 were affiliated 
with a national network and 87 were independent. Of the 595 
affiliated stations, 15 were owned by the networks themselves. 
Average station revenues in 1970 amounted to $2.01 million, 
and average station profits were $ .5 million. Such profits 
represent a techno-regulatory shortage of spectrum space 
that has forced the price of commercial time upward, rather 
than the restraint of competition by oligopolistic or monopo­
listic behavior on the part of television stations.
Although almost all Americans lie within the range of 
at least one television signal, less than half of the cities
^Harvey J. Levine, "Economic Structure and the Regula­
tion of Television," Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXXII 
(August, 1958), p. 429.
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where channels are allocated actually have a local station.
In Oklahoma, for example, commercial channels are allocated
to Ada, Ardmore, Bartlesville, Enid, Hugo, Lawton, Muskogee,
Oklahoma City, and Tulsa. Only Ada, Ardmore, Lawton, Okla-
2homa City, and Tulsa have stations in operation. The state 
of Delaware has no television station; New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, and Vermont each have only one station. All other 
states have at least three stations; but in Rhode Island and 
Utah, all three are located in Providence and Salt Lake City,
3
respectively. With respect to stations, the industry 
operates in an oligopolistic market.
Stations may be classified according to market size, 
network affiliation, and channel. Stations may also be 
classified according to the degree of autonony which they 
possess: (1) stations that are owned and operated by the
networks; (2) stations that are affiliated with the net­
works; and (3) stations that remain fully independent.
The power (wattage) of a television station does not 
give a reliable index of its range. Range depends in part 
on geographical factors and channel and in part on population
-'2 '  - 
See Table 17.
^Television Digest, Inc., Television Factbook.
Services Volume, 1971-1972, pp. 43-52-a.
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TABLE 17
OKLAHOMA COMMERCIAL TELEVISION ALLOCATIONS 
AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1970
City
Channels Allocated
In Use Not in Use
Ada 10
Ardmore 12
Bartlesville 17
Enid 20
Hugo 42
Lawton 7 16
Muskogee 19
Oklahoma City 4, 5, 9 14, 25, 34 
43
Tulsa 2, 6, 8 23, 29, 41
Source: Television Digest, Inc., Television
Factbook. 1971-1972, pp. 50-a and 
227-a.
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density. A mountain range may lessen the coverage area of a 
station of a given power over an otherwise similar station 
located elsewhere. Stations on lower (numbered) channels 
have, ceteris paribus, a greater coverage area than those 
on higher channels. Furthermore, a station of given power 
will have a larger potential audience in a densely populated 
area than in a sparsely populated one.
Besides station location, whether or not a station is 
affiliated with a network and whether or not it operates on 
a VHP channel are the three major determinants of the value 
of the station in terras of revenues, profits, and resale 
value. In order to indicate the significance of network 
affiliation and channel number, data were gathered for the 
top-ten markets (see Table 18) and a correlation analysis 
was made. According to FCC studies used in part to determine 
the fees charged broadcasters for services of the Commission, 
the most feasible standard which would reflect a station's 
relative position in a market is its rate card (i.e., price 
schedule) for the broadcast of commercials.^
In the first test, a value of 1 was assigned to a 
station if it was affiliated with a national network, and a
FCC, Reports, Vol. 21, January 30, 1970-March 20, 
1970, p. 507.
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TABLE 18
HIGHEST PRIME-TIME RATES FOR ONE 30-SECOND SPOT, 
TOP-TEN MARKETS, EFFECTIVE 
NOVEMBER 15-DECEMBER 15, 1970
Location
and Market Rank ■ Channel Station Affiliation Rate
New York (#1 market) 2 WCBS CBS $7000
4 WNBC NBC 6000
5 WNEW 1700
7 WABC ABC 5700
9 WOR — 600
11 WPIX ——— 900
41 WXTV 130
47 WNJU 114
Los Angeles (#2) 2 KXNT CBS 4750
4 KNBC NBC 4300
5 KTLA — 750
7 KABC ABC 3600
9 KHJ 750
11 KTTV 850
13 KCOP —  ™ 840
22 KWHY 40
34 KMEX 165
40 KLXA — — 81
52 KBSC 65
Chicago (#3) 2 HBBM CBS 3400
5 WMAQ NBC 3200
7 WLS ABC 3400
9 WON ——— 960
26 WCIÜ — 90
32 WFLD — 375
44 WSNS ——— 30
Philadelphia' (#4) 3 KYW NBC 2000
6 WFIL ABC 1800
10 WCAU CBS 2100
17 WPHL ——— 320
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TABLE 18— (Continued)
Location
and Market Range Channel Station Affiliation Rate
Philadelphia (#4)— Cont. 29 WTAF —  —  — 130
48 WKBS —— — 300
Detroit (#5) 2 WJBK CBS 1900
4 WWJ NBC 2000
7 WXYZ ABC 1400
9 CKLW — —— 320
50 WKBD 300
62 WXON 75
San Francisco (#6) 2 KTVÜ —— 840
4 KRON NBC 1400
5 KPIX CBS 1300
7 KGO ABC 1700
20 KEMO —— 60
38 KUDO — 18
44 KBBK ——— 35
Washington, D.C. (#7) 4 WRC NBC 1500
5 WTTG — —— 225
7 WMAL ABC 950
* 9 WTOP CBS 1300
14 WPAN — 67
20 WDCA ——— 70
St. Louis (#8) 2 KTVI ABC 825
4 KMOX CBS 1300
5 KSD NBC 775
11 KPLR — — 260
30 KDNL — — 45
Pittsburgh (#9) 2 KDKA CBS 900
4 WTAE ABC 900
11 WIIC NBC 1200
53 WPGH 300
Boston (#10) 4 WBZ NBC 1500
5 WHDH CBS 1400
7 WNAC ABC 1700
38 WSBK — —— 400
56 WKBG --- 300
Source: Standard Rate and Data Service, Inc., Spot Televi­
sion Rates and Data, November 15, 1970,
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value of 0 was assigned if it was unaffiliated. The value 
of 0 or 1 for each station was paired with its highest 
prime-time rate for the broadcast of one 30-second spot.
The coefficient of correlation r was computed, and a t-test 
made to determine if the value of r differed significantly 
from zero, where
t = r
\
n - r
For the top-ten markets (n - 65), r ^ 0.66 and t =
6.92. Since t = 6.92 has a probability (P) less than 0.001, 
the value of r is significant.
In the second test, a value of 1 was assigned to a 
station if it operated on a VHP channel (2-13) and a value 
of 0 was assigned if it operated on a UHF channel (14-83).
The value of 0 or 1 for each station was paired with its 
highest prime-time rate for the broadcast of one 30-second 
spot. For the top-ten markets, r = 0.55 and t = 5.22. This 
value of t 5.22 has P less than 0.001, and r is significant.
Therefore, for the top-ten markets, if a station is 
affiliated with a network, its commercial rates differ sig­
nificantly from unaffiliated stations in the same area. If 
a station is not affiliated with a network, but operates on
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a VHP channel, its rates are lower than those of affiliated 
stations in the same area, but significantly higher than the 
rates of unaffiliated stations operating on UHF channels.
In general, station location (implying audience size), net­
work affiliation, and channel number (2-13 or 14-83) are the 
three major determinants (in that order) of a station's value 
in terms of revenues, profits, and resale value.
Television Networks 
The functions of a national network are those of a 
broker or middleman. Steiner has defined a network organi­
zation as "any person, organized for profit, that undertakes 
to distribute, to stations, programs for simultaneous broad­
cast, and is capable of providing nationwide service."^ The 
network contracts with a number of stations to provide pro­
grams and commercial messages with unduplicated coverage, 
thus bringing buyers (the advertisers) of time and sellers 
(the stations) of time together. It acts as a sales agent 
for its affiliates and compensates them for carrying programs 
at a percentage— often 30 per cent— of the station's rate 
card. Networks may not require a station to carry any
5
Peter 0. Steiner, "Workable Competition in the Radio 
Broadcasting Industry" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. 
Harvard, 1949), p. 29.
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program, but an affiliate gets first refusal in his market 
of programs offered by his network. Programs and commercial 
messages are fed to affiliated stations via microwave and 
cable leased from the American Telephone and Telegraph 
company (AT&T).
Actually, the three national television networks in 
existence today deviate from the simple model of a broker 
of station time. Each is composed of five television sta­
tions, all fifteen of which are in the top-fifteen markets.
The American Broadcasting Company (ABC), the Columbia Broad­
casting System (CBS), and the National Broadcasting Company 
(NBC) are affiliated with 168, 203, and 224 stations, 
respectively, for a total of 595 of the 682 commercial tele­
vision stations on-the-air.^ The vertical integration of 
networks has not only been forward, but also backward into 
the area of program production and brokerage. These latter 
functions are under attack by the FCC for a variety of reasons 
to be discussed later in this chapter.
The Communications Act gives the FCC control over 
broadcasting, and thus networks were not subjected to direct 
control from the Commission. However, since each network
®See Table 19.
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TABLE 19
NETWORK AFFILIATION WITH TELEVISION STATIONS 
AS Oj: JUNE 1, 1970
Network Owned and 
Operated
Affiliated Total
ABC 5 163 168
CBS 5 198 203
NBC 5 219 224
Total 15 580 595
Network Owned and Operated Stations, 
Location and Market Rank, 1970
Network Station Location Market
Rank
ABC WABC
KABC
WLS
WXYZ
KGO
New York 
Los Angeles 
Chicago 
Detroit 
San Francisco
1
2
3
5
6
CBS WCBS •
KNXT
WBBM
WCAU
KMOX
New York 
Los Angeles 
Chicago 
Philadelphia 
St. Louis
1
2
3
4 
8
NBC WNBC
KNBC
WMAQ
WRC
WKYC
New York 
Los Angeles 
Chicago 
Washington 
Cleveland
1
2
3
7
11
Source: Television Digest, Inc., Television Fact­
book, 1971-1972, pp. 104-117-a and 56-a,
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operates its own stations and since station relationships 
with networks affect their ability to operate in the public 
interest, the Commission has assumed control over the network 
organizations.
History of Networks
The three current television networks were formed by 
three of the four current radio networks. On October 27,
1945, NBC linked WNBT (New York) with WRGB (SchenectadyT^nd 
WPTZ (Philadelphia) for its first network telecast, the 
appearance of President Harry S. Trumcuti at a Navy Day cele­
bration in New York City, On March 22, 1948, ABC linked WFIL 
(Philadelphia) to its Schenectady station, WRGB. On March 25, 
1948, CBS added WCAB (Philadelphia) to its New York station, 
WCBS, and later it added WMAR (Baltimore).^
The Du Mont Television Network, without the benefit 
of radio experience, launched a television network in 1949 
by linking the three stations owned by Allen B. Du Mont,
WABD (now WNEW, New York), WTTG (Washington), and WDTV (now 
KDKA, Pittsburgh). The Du Mont Television Network was dis­
continued in September, 1955, leaving only ABC, CBS, and NBC
g
for eleven years,
7
Bryce W. Rucker, The First Freedom, p. 143.
°Ibid.. p. 151.
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In July, 1966, the Overmyer-United Television Network 
was launched. On May 1, 1967, it was on-the-air with a 
limited but daily night-time program, but thirty-one days 
later it ceased operations.
The Unisphere Broadcasting System was proposed in 
May, 1965, to provide two and one-half hours of evening pro­
graming. In 1966 plans were still incomplete, apparently 
since the firm was unable to secure contracts with a respec­
table number of affiliates in major markets.
Also in 1966, the Mutual Broadcasting System (operator 
of the fourth radio network) indicated it would begin a 
fourth competitive television network, but no action has been 
taken. Apparently also dead or floundering are Trans-World 
Broadcasting, Unisphere Broadcasting, and the Kaiser Broad-
Q
casting Company.
The story of the " fourth network" continues to loom 
in the minds of those interested in program diversity. The 
recent growth in the number of UHF stations has also led to 
the hope that a fourth network might begin. The number of 
television markets with four or more commercial stations
9
See C. A. Kellner, "The Rise and Fall of the Overmyer 
Network," Journal of Broadca'stihfT, XIII (Spring, 1969), pp. 
125-126.
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more than doubled, from 18 to 40, between broadcast year 
1965-1966 and broadcast year 1968-1969, and more than 
tripled, from 18 to 57, between 1965-1966 and 1970-1971, 
These markets include over 60 per cent of all television 
homes. But barriers to entry into networking (to be dis­
cussed in detail later in this chapter) are so significant 
that prospects for a fourth network seem doubtful.
Economic Advantages of Affiliation
Networks offer real benefits to stations and 
advertisers. The popularity of network programs is due to 
their relatively high quality compared to locally produced 
programs, which is explained by the relatively small per 
viewer total cost of producing such programs. This mass 
popularity secures a large audience for the affiliated sta­
tions, and the national advertiser thus pays a relatively 
small cost per thousand viewers. Since he deals with one, 
or at most three firms, the national advertiser enjoys an 
even lower cost since only one filmed message need be deliv­
ered to only one firm to receive national coverage. And the 
station is relieved of the necessity of producing programs 
and running commercial messages. Its staff can be smaller 
and its costs lowered, although it receives continuous
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programing- Some of this programing may be sustaining 
(lacking commercial sponsorship), and the station may substi­
tute local sponsors for national ones. Such programs may 
offer real advantages in terms of listener appeal that could 
not be achieved by a locally produced program at a comparable 
cost.
Some intangible benefits of networking also accrue to 
stations and advertisers. The benefits of name, reputation, 
and prestige of the networks and their programs (especially 
news-type programs) accrue to the station in the local 
community. Valuable adjacencies are created by the network 
programs. There is thus an increase in non-network demand 
for station time because of the audience built-up by the 
network programs. And the station gets extra sales because 
it is part of a network which tends to force advertisers to 
take stations they would otherwise omit.
To be sure, there is a cost of networking to an 
affiliate. It must accept a division of the proceeds from 
the sale of time to network advertisers. But the firancial 
advantages of affiliation have proven to outweight the costs, 
and this is readily apparent from Table 21.^®
^^See page 94,
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Barriers to Entry: Television Stations
Program diversity has been lacking in the television 
broadcasting industry and this is due in large part to bar­
riers to entry, both with respect to stations and to networks. 
This section will discuss the barriers to station entry.
The following section will discuss the barriers to network 
entry.
Since television operates on a limited spectrum under 
a public franchise, and since it is a major source of enter­
tainment 2uid information for the great bulk of the population, 
it has been subjected to governmental control. Without such 
control, chaos would result in the industry as new stations 
would cause interference to existing ones in an effort to 
occupy a space on the spectrum. This so-called "wave piracy" 
characteristic of the early days of radio would reappear as 
entry would be no more difficult than applying power to a 
transmitter.
"Spectrum" refers to a defined range of radio waves 
utilized in communication, with the dimensions of frequency, 
time, and physical space. Its principle economic value lies 
in its use for conveying information of varying sorts over
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wide distances. Like other natural resources, spectrum has 
developed in relation to demand and supply.
The demand for spectrum is based on growth in 
population and per capita income and changes in taste. The 
supply of spectrum is the result of technical advances, 
improving the quality of existing space and making possible 
its use at higher frequencies.
The excess demand for broadcasting spectrum, not its 
depletion in use, makes it a scarce resource. The formal 
economic problem— the allocation of scarce resources among 
alternative uses to maximize graded ends— requires that all 
productive factors be distributed so as to equate their mar­
ginal value productivity in terms of all competing ends. In 
the television broadcasting industry, this problem is not 
solved by a perfectly competitive market for spectrum, 
utilizing a pricing system. The supply of and demand for 
spectrum is regulated by the federal government, since the 
supply is scarce relative to the demand and a free market to 
ration the available supply does not exist. At any given 
time, the supply of spectrum is perfectly inelastic, and
^^Barvey J. Levine, The Invisible Resource (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins Press, 1971), pp. 15-16.
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demand is limited by financial, technical, legal, and 
character constraints imposed on individuals by the FCC.
Huge capital investments (fixed costs) are thus not 
the major barrier to the entry of more television stations. 
The lack of spectrum space is a much more significant bar­
rier. This is not to say that there is no space available. 
Most of the idle channels, however, are in the UHF spectrum 
or in relatively undesirable markets. As a result, station 
growth in numbers is occurring at an ever decreasing rate. 
Between 1968 and 1969, the number of stations increased by
four per cent; between 1969 and 1970, by two per cent; and
12between 1970 and 1971, by less than one per cent.
Due to the limitation of facilities resulting from 
physical and artificial (licensing policy) factors, every 
station is in competition with existing or potential stations 
in the matter of getting and keeping its license. The Com­
mission has asserted and exercised its power to review the 
perfoirmance of existing stations by threatening non-renewal 
of their licenses.
To obtain a license, a potential broadcaster must 
prove to the commission that such a grant would be in the
^^See Table 3, p. 23.
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public interest and would not interfere with the signal of 
another station. To keep a license, the broadcaster must 
render the useful service promised and fulfill technical 
requirements. An existing station thus faces potential com­
petition from two sources: (1) a new competitor may obtain
a license to operate in the same area, or (2) its license 
may not be renewed and be given to another licensee.
In licensing new stations, the Commission has refused
13to consider economic injury to existing stations, but it 
has been reluctant to replace on licensee with another. The 
former condition makes the situation theoretically more com­
petitive, while the latter makes it less competitive. In 
practice, the situation is biased on the side of less com­
petition. New stations are virtually eliminated from the top 
markets. Coupled with the fact that license renewal is vir­
tually automatic except in cases of widespread abuse, the 
short-term license is a valuable franchise and entry at some 
levels is practically impossible.
^^This policy was supported by the Supreme Court in 
1940, when it declared that protection of an existing licensee 
against competition was not the basis for the Commission's 
power over entry into broadcasting. FCC v. Sanders Bros,
Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
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Spectrum limitations thus present a formidable barrier
to the entry of stations. However, were there not barriers
to network entry so that a fourth and perhaps a fifth network
could exist, there would be a smaller number of idle channels
and a larger number of profitable stations. That this would
probably be the case is supported by the fact that 84.6 per
cent of the network affiliated VHP stations and 51.1 per cent
of the network affiliated UHF stations were profitable in
1969, while only 61.8 per cent of the independent VHP stations
and 4.2 per cent of the independent UHP stations were profit-
14able in that year. The result of less formidable station
(and network) barriers to entry would be a tendency toward
greater program diversity. But these barriers will apparently 
not be relaxed in the near future.
Barriers to Entry: Television Networks
Network operation, unlike station operation, is not 
protected by a license, and there are no artificial (i.e., 
regulatory) prohibitions placed upon new competition.
Table 8 indicates that investment requirements present no 
formidable barrier to entry. The high profits indicated in 
Table 7 would lead one to expect entry of new capital and
^^See Table 21, p. 94.
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competition into the networking sector of the television 
broadcasting industry. There are six explanations for the 
lack of entry into networking.
(1) A limitation on network entry is set by the
shortage of competing facilities in major markets due to the
limited VHP spectrum. As of March, 1970, thirteen of the
top-25 markets, thirty-six of the top-50 markets, and eighty- 
two of the top-100 markets, had 3 VHP stations or less. Only 
eighteen of the top-100 markets had over three competing
  15
VHP outlets. Thus, unless UHF television becomes more 
competitive with VHP, the technical limitations to the number 
of possible VHP stations preclude the entry of a fourth net­
work having primary affiliation with stations in most of the 
top-100 markets so as to reach a substantial portion of the 
national market.
(2) The existing arrangement whereby affiliated 
stations simply "ride" one network (i.e., carry most of the 
programs offered by the network), in conjunction with the 
shortage of facilities outlined above, further limits the 
access a potential network may have to stations in signifi­
cant markets where less than four competitive outlets exist.
^^See Table 20.
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TABLE 20
NUMBER OF VHP CHANNELS IN MAJOR MARKETS
Over 3 
VHP Channels
3
VHP
2
VHP
1
VHP
0
VHP
Top-25 Markets 12 12 1 0 0
Top-50 Markets 14 25 10 1 0
Top-100 Markets 18 48 19 8 7
Source; Data gathered from Television Digest, Inc., 
Television Factbook, 1971-1972, pp. 56-58-a.
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As long as concentration among the existing three networks
in terms of prime-time occupancy and night-time audience
shares remains at present levels, potential networks are
precluded from entry.
(3) The nature of the service that a network sells
makes it difficult for a firm to enter the industry by slowly
and incrementally gaining access to a national audience, even
if that were possible. Advertisers of nationally distributed
products prefer advertising media which reach a national
market, and do not consider a growing network with half the
desired coverage as a good buy— even at half the total cost.
Perhaps this is attributable to the fact that the cross
elasticity of demand by advertisers for different media is
small, and they are considered by advertisers to be poor
substitutes because of their different basic appeals and
their tendency to reinforce rather than duplicate each other
X6in a balanced advertising budget. Accordingly, a potential 
network must attain the status of existing networks before 
it can compete with them, and yet, ironically, the lack of 
means to such status (e.g., advertising revenues and major 
station affiliations) is the nature of the problem.
^^Harvey J. Levine, "Workable Competition," p. 103.
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(4) A potential network, like existing ones, 
encounters substantial economies of scale with respect to 
program cost per viewer. The cost of producing a given pro­
gram is independent of the size of the audience it reaches. 
But a potential network with a relatively small audience must 
produce shows of the same quality as existing networks in 
order to compete effectively. Since advertisers prefer to 
patronize networks which offer the lowest cost per thousand, 
economies of scale in program production present an economic 
barrier to the entry of new networks.
(5) Furthermore, with respect to costs, the use of 
cable and microwave relays in networking result in a heavy 
fixed cost, and a sufficient volume of use is necessary to 
reduce the average fixed cost of these facilities. AT&T 
rates discriminate against use of these facilities for less 
than eight hours per day. This is largely attributable to 
the high costs to the telephone company of installing and 
maintaining them. Obviously a new network must start with 
less than a full program schedule and thus must face rela­
tively high average fixed costs.
(6) When competition has developed in networking, the 
existing firms have risen to suppress it. For example, the
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Overmyer-United Network began on May 1, 1967, with a two-hour 
late-evening variety show filmed in Las Vegas. The only 
network competitor then was NBC's "Tonight Show," However, 
ABC quickly announced it has signed Joey Bishop to star in 
a late-night show, and CBS announced that it would begin a 
similar late-night program during the next year. Planning 
to expand to a fifty-six hour per week program schedule in 
the fall of 1967, the Overmyer-United Network was not allowed 
to get on its feet.
Network television since 1948 has been a profitable 
oligopoly, but no new firm is likely to enter in the fore­
seeable future primarily because of technical and economic 
factors at work against such entry.
Regulatory Efforts to Diversify Programing 
The policy efforts of the FCC in recent years have 
been directed toward program diversity so that television 
will serve a larger fraction of the population, and serve 
better. Its most outstanding means to this end were increas­
ing the number of stations through the development of UHF 
television, limiting the multiple ownership of stations, 
issuing the Blue Book, and reducing the control of the 
national networks over programing by outlawing option time
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and initiating the prime-time access rule. The remainder of 
this chapter will consider each of these attempts at alter­
ing the structure of the industry in the interest of program 
diversity.
Efforts to Increase Competition 
The two major efforts of the FCC to increase the level 
of competition in the interest of program diversity were 
through (1) eî^anding the spectrum (and therefore the number 
of stations) by encouraging the development of UHF television 
and (2) increasing the number of independently owned stations 
by controlling multiple ownership. The assumption of the 
FCC is that program diversity is a function of the number of 
stations and the number of different owners of these stations.
Increasing the Number of Stations 
via UHF Development
In order to analyze the UHF problem in detail, some 
technical and statistical facts need to be spelled out. Then 
the history of the problem and some possible solutions that 
have been offered will be discussed.
Unlike AM radio, television operates on a line-of- 
sight basis. Signals will not traverse the horizon and may 
be obstructed by large structures, either man-made or natural.
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Furthermore, an AM station requires a channel only 10 
kilocycles wide while a television station requires a 600- 
kilocycle^ide channel. Thus, compared to standard radio, 
fewer television stations can be accommodated. Only some 
1200 commercial television assignments can be made on the 
82 channels allocated for television broadcasting, while 
over 4300 commercial AM stations already operate within that 
portion of the spectrum allocated to standard broadcasting.
The per market maximum imposed by the FCC on broadcast 
stations is about 10 to 15 in television and 30 to 34 in AM 
broadcasting. In 1968, a per market average of only 4.2 
television stations was actually authorized in the top-50 
markets, less than one-half of the technical maximum. Even 
more dramatic is the contrast between VHP and UHF television—  
a per market average of 3.1 VHF as compared with 1.0 UHF in 
the top-50 markets, and 2.6 VHF as compared with 0.9 UHF in 
the top-100 markets.
At the end of 1970, there were only 682 commercial 
television stations on the air. Of these, only 179 or 26 
per cent were UHF, even though over 70 per cent of all chan­
nels are allocated in that band. But these figures alone are
^^Harvey J. Levine, The Invisible Resource, p. 6.
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not sufficient to indicate the real nature of the UHF problem. 
A glance at Table 21 reveals some interesting observations.
Of the 142 UHF stations reporting in 1969, only 35.2 
per cent were profitable, while 82.9 per cent of the 456 
reporting VHF stations showed positive profits. Furthermore, 
most of the profitable UHF stations were affiliated with a 
national network. Only 4.2 per cent of the unaffiliated 
UHF stations showed a positive profit in 1969.
History of the UHF Problem. The advent of television 
immediately following World War II posed far-reaching eco­
nomic and physical problems. The roots of the UHF problem 
date back to 1945 when the Commission, unmindful of the tre­
mendous growth potential of television, allocated 13 VHF 
channels (subsequently cut to 12) to serve the immediate 
needs of television.
The plight of UHF was charted mainly by RCA. To 
reduce competition and enhance its profits, RCA convinced 
the FCC that television should be assigned to the (extremely 
limited) VHF spectrum. Frequencies in this spectrum were 
already limited by heavy dememds from noncommercial broad­
casters, primarily the military. The FCC told licensees 
that all telecasting would be moved to the more spacious
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TABLE 21
PROFIT AND LOSS OF TELEVISION STATIONS 
(Before Federal Income Tax),
1969
Total
Network
Affiliated Independent
VHF UHF VHP UHF VHP UHF
Number of 
Stations 
Reporting
456 142 422 94 34 48
Stations
Reporting
Profits
378 50 357 48 21 2
Per Cent 
Profitable 
Stations
82.9 35.2 84.6 51.1 61.8 4.2
Stations
Reporting
Losses
78 92 65 46 13 46
Per Cent
Unprofitable
Stations
17.1 64.8 15.4 48.9 38.2 95.8
Source: FCC, Annual Report, 1970, p. 159.
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higher frequencies if the medium proved successful. This 
was easier said than done. This victory (for RCA and other 
existing broadcasters) drastically limited the number of 
stations that could exist in any given geographical area and 
caused a problem that has not yet been solved.
By 1948, the FCC was aware that a problem was rising. 
Sixteen stations were on the air and 108 others had been
  I o
authorized on the 12 VHF channels allocated to television.
On September 30 the Commission declared a "freeze" on 
licenses for new television stations. When the freeze was 
lifted on April 14, 1952, the FCC announced a new Television 
Allocation Plan in its Sixth Report and Order. The Plan 
included an allocation table providing over 2000 assignments 
in almost 1300 communities across the nation, and it provided 
for 12 VHP and 70 UHF channels. Subsequent rule changes have 
left fewer assignments today (about 1850 in 850 communities), 
but about one-third of these are earmarked for educational 
purposes.
The FCC committed two mistakes in one. First, the 
freeze gave those occupying the VHF channels an opportunity
1ftBroadcasting Yearbook, (Washington, D.C.; Broad­
casting Publications, Inc., 1969), p. A-131.
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to (1) build viewer loyalty at a time when receiver sales 
were growing very r a p i d l y , (2) enrich themselves under 
near-monopoly conditions during a period when practically 
all receivers had only VHF tuners, and (3) improve their 
equipment, programing techniques, and relations with adver­
tisers. UHF newcomers were placed at a distinct disadvantage.
Second, by intermixing channel assignments (VHF and 
UHF in the same market), UHF broadcasters were to lose 
millions of dollars and the use of the UHF band was to be 
stymied and placed in a strait jacket from which it has never 
been able to free itself.^0
Since the limited number of VHF channels was 
recognized to be inadequate for a nationwide competitive 
television service, the FCC expected that the UHF band would 
be fully utilized and eventually UHF stations would be able 
to compete on a favorable basis with VHF stations. It became 
apparent by 1956, however, that UHF was not developing as had 
been anticipated, and that UHF stations in both large and
19Over 600 per cent between 1948 and 1952. See 
Television Digest, Inc., Television Factbook, 1971-1972, 
p. 79-a.
20See Bryce W. Rucker, The First Freedom (Carbondale, 
Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1968), p.
159.
97
small markets were having difficulty in operating 
successfully. Consider some of the reasons for this 
difficulty.
Obstacles to the Growth of UHF Television. Except in 
areas where only UHF stations existed, few television 
receivers prior to 1965 had UHF tuners. Production of all­
channel television sets declined consistently from 1953 to 
1961. For example, 20.2 per cent of the 7,126,000 television 
sets manufactured in 1953 contained UHF tuners. By 1957 only
12.2 per cent were equipped with UHF tuners, and by 1961
21this percentage had fallen to 6.
Networks have generally not affiliated with UHF 
stations if a competing VHF station is available. Thus UHF 
stations have been forced to telecast reruns of old network 
shows, progreuns that networks have rejected, old movies, 
documentaries, and extremely expensive station-produced local 
live programs.
Scarcity of UHF receivers (and the habitual reluctance 
to tune to UHF stations by those whose sets are so equipped) 
as well as lack of network affiliation (resulting in an even
^^Ibid., p. 160.
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smaller audience) has convinced most advertisers that UHF
is a poor advertising buy, even though its rates are much
lower than those of VHF stations in the same markets. UHF
affiliated stations generally charge one-third or less for
time than do VHF affiliated stations in the same area. Rate
  22
differences are even greater for nonaffiliated UHF stations.
Furthermore, the signal strength and clarity of UHF 
make it inferior to VHF. A UHF station of one million 
(visual) watts may actually have a shorter range than a VHF 
station with one-tenth that power.
Thus, the vicious circle of UHF broadcasting (small 
audience, few sponsors, lack of revenue, few good programs, 
little reason for people to watch or even purchase receivers 
with UHF tuners, small audience) continues. Wishing to break 
this vicious circle and promote the development of the UHF 
spectrum, the FCC, broadcasters, and other interested groups 
have offered suggestions. Some of these have been tried. 
Others have been forgotten. None have fully solved this 
pressing problem of the television industry.
Proposals to Expand UHF Television. As early as 1956 
the Commission considered the deintermixture of VHF and UHF
^^See Table 19.
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assignments in communities where it appeared that such action 
might be expected to improve the opportunities for the growth 
of effective outlets. Disagreements resulted over whether 
or not a minimal effort here would really suffice and 
whether a full-scale effort that separated the two types of 
markets widely might not seriously reduce service in fringe 
areas and also result in an enormous expenditure by the 
public for new sets (or UHF receiving devices on old sets) 
and antennas. CBS estimated the cost of achieving the com­
munity station and multiple service goals, by giving each of 
the 1200 television communities either all VHF or all UHF 
outlets, with no overshadowing, at one billion dollars for
set, equipment, and antenna conversion, plus the loss of
23service to several million viewers.
Another proposal offered was to move all television to 
the UHF band. This would not only fully activate the entire 
UHF band, but also release twelve scarce VHF channels for 
other uses. The fear that as many as 8 million people in 
fringe areas would lose service and the estimated transitional
23Reported to U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Television Inquiry, II,
Sen. Res. 13 and 163, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1956), pp. 797-808.
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costs of from $1.5 to $2.5 billion were the successful 
obj ections.
The military VHF spectrum could theoretically have 
accommodated all television had the military been willing to 
accept in return the UHF spectrum. Such an exchange was 
proposed by the FCC, but the military rejected the proposal 
on August 15, 1960, because of the estimated $5 billion cost 
of conversion, the loss of defense capability during the 
conversion process, and uncertainty as to whether military 
capabilities acquired would be comparable to those lost. 
Furthermore, there was no way of comparing the net economic 
benefits that would accrue to the television industry with 
the cost of developing a new military system in the UHF band. 
The military could not be expected to willingly move else­
where at a considerable cost to do the same thing no better.
No appeal was filed after the decision was made by the. 
military. Existing licensees wanted no more VHF competition 
and the public was not pressing for more channels. This 
made it clear that fulfillment of the objectives of the 
nation's television system could be achieved only through a 
much fuller utilization of the UHF channels.
^^Harvey J. Levine, "Economic Structure," p. 437.
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Concurrent with the deintermixture proposal, the 
Commission considered a drop-in of third VHF channels at 
less than the minimum mileage separation requirements to 
eight communities. The absence of a third comparable facil­
ity was of concern to the Commission because of the effect 
upon nationwide network competition. However, this interest 
was tempered by consideration of the need to encourage UHF 
broadcasting. It was the Commission's subsequent decision 
that new VHF assignments would inevitably affect UHF 
development by removing choice opportunities for UHF sta­
tions. The idea was dropped with the exception of Oklahoma
City, to which channel 5 was assigned from Enid because there
25
were already three VHF channels in the Oklahoma City market.
Because of its location and identity with Enid, ROCO-TV 
was not able to achieve competitive acceptance and status in 
the Oklahoma City market, from which it derived its principal 
support. No substantial adverse effect on UHF was expected 
by moving KOCO-TV since there were three VHF signals in the 
Oklahoma City market to begin with. It did, however, improve
25The seven cities denied a third VHF assignment were 
Charlotte, Dayton, Jacksonville, Birmingham, Knoxville,
Baton Rouge, and Johnstown. See FCC, Annual Report, 1963, 
pp. 68-69.
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the local competitive situation and aid the nationwide 
competitive structure.
Ordinarily the Commission is reluctant to withdraw 
from a community its only local service in order to assign 
the channel to a larger community which has operating sta­
tions. The station was reminded, however, of its obligations
26to serve the needs and interests of its entire service area.
The FCC also considered providing a "pool" of UHF 
frequencies for existing VHF licenses and permitting dual 
VHF-UHF operation by commercial television licensees. The 
proposal for dual operation was intended to stimulate inaug­
uration of UHF services in predominantly VHF markets, cuid 
the pool of UHF channels was designed to provide VHF stations 
with a UHF channel for dual operation.
The FCC invited comments on the proposal. The majority 
of those received opposed the so-called pool plan as wasteful 
of spectrum space and contrary to the goal of promoting com­
petition, without any real likelihood of stimulation for UHF 
or of providing additional service for the public. Since 
all-channel receivers were to promote the fuller use of UHF 
channels, the proposal was dropped.
26f c c , Television Matters, Reports, Vol. 41 (Washing­
ton, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 1125.
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Perhaps the proposal should not have been dropped.
Such operations would not only have fostered an interest in 
UHF channels, but also would have provided a useful tele­
vision service. Where no adverse impact would accrue to 
existing UHF stations, the multiple ownership rules could 
be waived to the extent necessary.
For example, to permit VHF stations to be licensees 
of UHF stations in order to carry the third major network 
(in a one or two network community) may be in the public 
interest. Furthermore, the UHF channel could be used for 
repeat performances so that viewers who missed a show of 
their choice or desired another viewing of it could be served.
Effective July 5, 1960, the Commission permitted UHF 
broadcast stations to use boosters to fill in "shadows" 
within their normal service areas but not to extend their 
coverage. Such a booster merely amplifies and retransmits 
the programs of the parent station on the letter's channel.
It does not have an individual call signal and its iraximum 
effective radiated power is limited to 5 kilowatts. The pur­
pose of such a booster operation is to enable a UHF station 
to provide reasonably unifoxrm coverage, particularly where
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there is rugged terrain, without resorting to extremely high 
27power.
Other proposals were endorsed by the Commission to 
promote the development of UHF. Certain technical require­
ments were relaxed in order to reduce the installation and 
operating costs of UHF stations, and the use of directive 
transmitting antennas was allowed to permit better signals.
The Commission also considered adopting a first-come 
first-served policy so that a qualified application for a 
UHF channel might be granted without compeurative hearing 
against possible competition for the channel.
Another proposal was to offer a tax-relief on all- 
channel receivers as a means to reducing the cost differen­
tial between VHF-UHF and VHF-only sets. Existing VHF stations 
were much in favor of this proposal since it did not involve 
elaborate, disruptive solutions that might involve substan­
tial cost outlays and detailed governmental regulation. But 
nothing ever came of it.
Perhaps the most significant attempt to rescue UHF 
television came in 1962. The production of all-channel sets 
had fallen to a record low of 6 per cent of all new sets.
^^FCC, Annual Report, 1960, pp. 49-50.
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On September 13, the FCC acted on its newly conferred 
authority from Congress (Public Law 87-529) to institute 
rule-making requiring that all television sets shipped in 
interstate commerce or imported into the United States for 
sale or resale be all-channel television receivers. The 
rule was made final on November 23, 1962, to go into effect 
April 30, 1964.
Following the adoption of the all-channel law, the 
percentage of television homes with VHF-UHF receivers
28
tripled, from 22.8 per cent in 1965 to 68 per cent in 1970, 
The boom in portable receivers and the widespread desire for 
color receivers has stimulated the purchase of new sets, 
making the plan work better than anticipated.
According to Lawrence D. Longley, opposition to
deintermixture was the reason that the all-channel receiver
law was passed.
This controversy shows an interesting converging of 
the interests of the industry in avoiding a certain 
type of policy, with the renewed interest of the 
Commission in providing for diversity and additional 
competition in television broadcasting. The result 
was a pattern of pressures favoring the all-channel
no
FCC, Annual Report. 1969, pp. 41-42, and 1970,
p. 3.
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receiver bill sufficient to insure its adoption as 
a definitive public policy.
In February, 1970, the Commission adopted rules 
requiring the manufacture of television sets with comparable 
VHF and UHF tuning facilities. The schedule provides that 
10 per cent of a manufacturer's sets must have "comparable 
systems for tuning the VHF . . .  and UHF channels" by 
July 1, 1971, 40 per cent by July 1, 1972, 70 per cent the 
following year, and all sets by July 1, 1974.^®
UHF Development and Program Diversity. As early as 
1948, the FCC recognized that the limited VHF spectrum would 
be insufficient to provide for a complete television service 
in the United States, so it imposed ? freeze on television 
licenses; and four years later the Commission presented a 
plan for intermixed channel assignments. This was perhaps 
one of the biggest mistakes the Commission has ever made, 
notwithstanding the fact that hindsight is better than fore­
sight. VHF television had been firmly ingrained into the 
viewing patterns of the public, and intermixing UHF with VHF
29Lawrence D. Longley, "The FCC emd the All-Channel 
Receiver Bill of 1962," Journal of Broadcasting, XIII (Summey, 
1969), p. 299.
^^Broadcasting, June 29, 1970, p. 73.
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was to present problems lasting even to the present day as 
far as promoting program diversity via larger and larger 
numbers of stations throughout the nation as well as within 
each market.
Many solutions for the UHF problem have been offered,
and several of these have been tried, but UHF television has
had limited prosperity. In 1954 there were 121 UHF stations
on the air. By 1960 this number had fallen to 75 and had
increased to only 88 at the time of the enactment of the
all-channel receiver law. At the end of 1970, there were
31179 UHF stations on the air.
The doubling of the number of UHF stations on the air 
between 1964 and 1970 is largely attributable to the success 
of the all-channel receiver law. But there is also another 
factor of great importance. The maximum number of VHP sta­
tions that can operate on the twelve channels in that spectrum 
is approximately 560.^2 That number has almost been reached, 
and those VHF allocations that are available are in relatively 
undesirable locations. Thus any real physical growth in the 
number of stations on the air has had to occur in the UHF
^^See Table 3.
32Harvey J. Levine, "Economic Structure," p. 425.
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spectrum. Had the FCC not intermixed the two bands in any 
given area, or better still, had television been completely 
moved to the larger UHF spectrum, there would probably be 
more than 682 stations on the air. The degree of competi­
tion in the industry would be greater and programing would 
be more diverse.
The real cost of the wrong decision is the 
opportunities that probably are permanently lost. Develop­
ment of the UHF spectrum appears to be a fruitless means of 
increased program diversity as long as the current economic 
structure of only commercial television continues. Such a 
situation is obviously less than optimal, and the current 
structure seems frozen with respect to a solution.
Controlling Multiple Ownership
The FCC has played an important role in maintaining 
and fostering competition in the television broadcasting 
industry. Its jurisdiction has not been limited to striking 
down monopolies after they have risen, but to policing the 
industry, searching for indications of approaching monopo­
lies, and instituting policies that will halt such develop­
ments. The Commission feels that promoting competition is
109
one means to promoting diversified programing, which is in 
the public interest.
In past years, the Commission encouraged AM station 
licensees to become television station licensees in their 
own area as well as in other areas, and again, later, to 
acquire FM stations. The objective of encouraging the larger 
and more effective use of the broadcasting band was over­
riding, since television and FM channels were lying unused.
But conditions have changed, and the shortage of frequencies 
has prompted the FCC in recent years to promote diversifi­
cation of control of the means of communication. The Com­
mission holds the view that 40 different licensees are more 
desirable than 30, and even that 41 are more desirable than 
40.^^ This is true so long as this does not result in a 
significant deterioration in the quality of service.
Commission attempts at preventing concentration of 
control of television and broadcasting in general have been 
numerous. The first formal proceeding in this matter occurred 
in 1938 when the Commission instituted the Chain Broadcasting 
Investigation, In 1941, the FCC reported that the NBC and
^^See FCC, Reports, Vol. 22, March 27, 1970-May 22, 
1970, p. 312.
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CBS radio networks impeded competition and would be granted 
no additional licenses. Furthermore, they were required to 
divest stations in markets where they owned more than one 
AM station. No limit was placed on the number of stations 
a single owner could control.
On June 21, 1940, the FCC ruled that no person could 
own more than one FM station in an area or a total of six 
throughout the country. On April 30, 1941, the FCC limited 
television station ownership to three stations for a single 
licensee, but this was increased to five on May 16, 1944. 
NBC fostered the increase by arguing that a larger number 
of stations was necessary to permit the development of tele­
vision networks. On November 23, 1943, the FCC prohibited 
the common ownership of AM stations in an area, but placed 
no limit on the total number an individual might own.
Ten years later, on November 7, 1953, the FCC ruled 
that one person could own a maximum of seven AM, seven FM, 
and five television licenses. This rule was amended on 
September 7, 1954, to permit ownership by a single licensee 
of seven television stations, no more than five of which 
could be VHF stations. The 1954 ruling remained in effect 
for ten years.
Ill
On December 18, 1964, the FCC stated that it would 
designate for hearing any application for the acquisition of 
a VHF station in one of the top-50 television markets if the 
applicant owned one or more stations at the time of applica­
tion. On June 21, 1965, the Commission proposed a ruling 
that would prohibit acquisition of more than three television 
stations, no more than two of which could be VHF, in the 
top-50 markets. A maximum of seven television stations, no 
more than five of which can be VHF, in any markets still
remains in effect. No divestiture of existing licenses was
. 34 proposed.
In March, 1970, the Commission adopted rules 
prohibiting ownership of stations in different services (AM, 
PM, or television) in the same city or town, but the rules 
do not apply to existing holdings. There are some exceptions 
provided for in this ruling.
The licensee of a class IV AM station (local with 
power limited to 1000 watts) in a community of less than 
10,000 people may obtain a license for an FM station serving 
the same area. The licensee of a daytime-only AM station 
may secure a license for an FM station in the same market.
^"*Ibid., pp. 701-702.
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However, an FM licensee cannot obtain a daytime-only AM 
license in the same market. An existing AM-FM combination 
in the same market can be secured by another party not own­
ing a service in the area if a proper showing is made that 
for economic or technical reasons the stations cannot be 
sold and operated separately.^®
In summary, commonly-owned stations in the same 
broadcast service are prohibited from operating in the same 
area (the so-called "duopoly" rule). A single owner may 
control a maximum of seven AM, seven FM, and seven televi­
sion stations, no more than five of which may be VHF stations 
(the so-called "concentration of control" rule). Further­
more, the Commission designates for hearing any application 
for the acquisition of a VHF station in one of the top-50 
television markets if the applicant currently owns or has 
interests in one or more VHF stations in those markets.®®
With certain exceptions, licenses are forbidden from acquir­
ing a second service in the same area.
The multiple ownership rules are designed to 
prevent undue concentration of control and monopoly in the
®®See Ibid., p. 339 and FCC, Annual Report, 1970, p. 3.
®®See Ibid.. p. 697 and FCC, Annual Report, 1968, p.
26.
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broadcasting industry, and at the same time to encourage 
the greatest possible diversity in programing. Besides 
increasing concentration and limited program diversity, 
another alleged effect of combined ownership of broadcast 
stations in the same market is to lessen the degree of com­
petition for advertising among the alternative media. Another 
is that a combined owner may use practices which exploit his 
advantage over the single-station owner. Such practices 
include special discounts for advertisers using more than 
one medium, or cumulative volume discounts covering adver­
tising placed on more than one medium. Furthermore, it is 
alleged that the use of identical call letters for commonly 
owned stations in the same area has anticompetitive effects.
Recently a study was made to determine if television 
stations owned by multiple licensees achieve significantly 
more revenue (network, spot, and local) per home delivered 
than do television stations owned by single licensees. 
Ninety-two per cent of the television stations on the air in 
1965 were sampled. From the study, it was concluded that 
"in television, looking at the comparison between multiple 
licensees and single licensees over all markets and within 
the market rank categories of 1-50, 51-100, and 101 and above.
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there is no ownership effect on total revenue per home 
delivered.
Another recent study reconfirms these findings. To 
test the supposition that group-owned stations have a greater 
bargaining power with advertisers, the cost per thousand 
homes reached based on prime 20-second spot rates for both 
group-owned and single-owner stations was compared. No sig­
nificant difference was found in the overall averages for 
the group-owned stations versus the single-owner stations 
($3,27 and $3,28, respectively).
An analysis of network affiliation refuted the 
hypothesis that group-owned stations were affiliated with 
the "better” and "stronger" networks, i.e., NBC and CBS, The 
weakest network, ABC, had the same proportion (33 per cent)
of stations affiliated with it for both group and single 
39
owners. Whether groups have undue economic power as com­
pared with single owners was also examined by considering
37James A. Anderson, Robert L, Coe, and James G. 
Saunders, "Economic Issues Relating to the FCC's Proposed 
'One-to-a-Customer' Rule,” Journal of Broadcasting, XIII 
(Summer, 1969), p. 252,
^®Robert Brandwein, Paul W. Cherington, and Leon V. 
Hirsch, Television Station Ownership (New York: Hastings
House, Publishers, 1971), pp. 46-64.
39
Ibid.. p. 46.
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their relative profitability. If group-owned stations have
an advantageous competitive position in the industry, they
should be realizing greater profits than single owners as a
result of their monopolistic power. The measure used was
profits before taxes expressed as percentages of broadcast
revenue. No substantial difference was found between the
profits of groups and single owners except for the larger
groups (those with four or more stations). The higher ratio
recorded for these reflects the profitability of the network
owned-and-operated stations, which is largely attributable to
40their location in the top-ten markets.
Multiple ownership of television stations apparently 
does not result in monetary advantages to the group-owned 
stations by allowing them to secure a greater bargaining 
power with advertisers or to become affiliated with the so- 
called "stronger" networks. In fact, other things being the 
same, the type of ownership characteristic of a given station 
(e.g., single-owner versus group-owner) has little bearing 
on its revenue situation. While multiple ownership increases 
the total revenues and profits of the parent firm, it has no 
effect on the total revenue per home delivered of a given 
station (i.e., plant).
"^°Ibid.. pp. 61-64.
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The multiple ownership rules might be economically 
justified# however# if they tended to encourage more diverse 
programing on the limited broadcast spectrum. In fact# such 
rules do not have this desired tendency. Consider the 
reason.
An obvious fact about television progreuning is that
it is extremely expensive. An hour television network show
41costs about $200#000# and these costs are increasing. At
the same time# advertising revenue is increasing# but at a 
decreasing rate. Thus programing is becoming relatively 
more expensive each year.
Traditional antitrust policy favors growth of 
enterprises through internal expansion# rather than through 
merger. The technical parameters of operation of a tele­
vision station limit its range of reception# and the amount 
of advertising that any station can accept is limited by the 
amount of time available. The Television code of the 
National Association of Broadcasters fixes limits on the 
amount of commercial time a station may carry# and the Com­
mission favors compliance with the code. Thus television
^^Newsweek# January 22, 1968# p. 94. 
42
See figures in Chapter II.
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stations do not have the possibility of growth through 
internal expansion that is open to other types of firms.
Horizontal integration is limited by the "duopoly” 
and "concentration of control” rules. However the simple 
numerical ceiling which is imposed equally on all groups 
irrespective of the markets in which they operate (7 televi­
sion stations, no more than 5 of which may be VHF) has little 
real basis. The owner of a station in the top market could 
easily reach a larger audience than a 7-station owner in 
smaller markets. Such a rule results in a subsidy to those 
fortunate enough to secure a "good” channel. Such subsi­
dies take the form of an economic rent when the station is
sold.43
Vertical integration in the television market implies 
an expansion into program production. Almost all television 
stations engage in this activity to some extent, but the 
costs of program production constitute an economic barrier 
to this kind of activity on a large scale by any entity 
lacking very large amounts of capital. The multiple
4^In 1958, the Columbia Broadcasting System bought 
WCAU from the Philadelphia Evening Bulletin for $20,000,000.
Of this, it paid $4,400,000 for the station's physical 
assets, $3,000,000 for its AM and FH licenses, and $12,600,000 
for its television license.
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ownership rules, which limit horizontal merger, thus limit 
vertical integration since program production is profitable 
only when supported by large amounts of capital resources.
The multiple ownership rules would appear to 
discourage program diversity by encouraging stations to use 
network programs in the interest of profit maximization 
rather than to seek a more diversified (and more costly) 
program fare of syndicated and local programing.
Furthermore, the multiple ownership rules of 1964, 
1965, and 1970 which do not require divestitute of existing 
licenses impose no handicap on the present networks and 
other large multiple owners. But new enterprises are pre­
vented from acquiring as many stations as these large groups 
currently own. The rules thus protect the present multiple 
owners against new or increased competition, while prevent­
ing or discouraging the growth and expansion of smaller 
enterprises in television broadcasting and the entry of 
strong new enterprises. The more recent multiple ownership 
rules thus do significant harm to the cause of program 
diversity and competition in the field of television broad­
casting without countervailing benefits.
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Direct Control over Product Differentiation 
Besides its regulatory efforts to increase competition, 
the FCC has assumed direct control over product differentia­
tion in the interest of program diversity. Its means were 
through the issuance of the Blue Book, and reducing the 
control of the national networks over programing by outlaw­
ing option time and initiating the prime-time access rule.
The Blue Book
The first major effort of the Commission in the area
of programing occurred in 1946 when it issued the famous 
44
Blue Book. A "balanced program fare” was prescribed and 
a quantitative evaluation of a station's overall performance 
was proposed. For a broadcast service to be "balanced," it 
should include sustaining (non-sponsored) programs, local 
live programs, and discussions of public issues.
According to the Blue Book, sustaining programs are 
essential for several reasons. Some types of programs are 
not appropriate for commercial sponsorship. Minority inter­
ests should be served and yet may not be attractive
*^The full title is Public Service Responsibility of 
Broadcast-Licensees (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1946).
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advertising targets. Non-profit organizations should have 
some access to broadcast facilities. And there should be 
experimentation in programing, although advertisers may not 
be willing to risk untried formulas.
The Blue Book also maintained that local live 
programs are necessary for local self-expression in a commun­
ity. The FCC emphasized the use of local facilities along 
with reception from such facilities. Discussions of public 
issues reveal the concern of the Commission that broadcasting 
be used as a medium for disseminating ideas and opinions as 
well as facts and entertainment.
By 1961 the Blue Book was forgotten. But that year 
the application form for a broadcasting license was modified 
to require a showing of the measures taken to determine the 
"needs” and interests of the community and the methods by 
which the applicant proposed to meet such needs.
But this has been no more effective in guaranteeing 
diversified programing than the Blue Book. Actually, the 
only way such a procedure can become effective is if the 
Commission itself determines the "needs” and interests of 
the communities involved. In the words of Fisher, "If the 
inquiry of the licensee is sketchy, if he talks to the wrong 
people, if he receives unreliable information, if his polling
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skills are inadequate, if his evaluation is faulty, if he 
relies on unstated techniques to determine program needs, 
the programing may not be reasonably responsive to the needs 
of the community, but the Commission will never know."^^ Of 
course, the Commission does not have the time nor the 
resources to engage in such detailed studies of community 
"needs."
The Outlawing of Option Time
What the American public sees on television is largely 
determined by those who control the major television net­
works. A major effort to diversify programing came on 
September 10, 1963, when the Commission prohibited "option 
time, " a contract between a network and an affiliate whereby 
the latter promises clearance for network programs during 
specified hours of specified segments of the broadcast day. 
The Commission concluded that option time "is not essential 
to successful television network operations, that it 
restrains the freedom of choice of licensees as to what pro­
grams to present and at what times to present them, and
45Ben C. Fisher, "Program Control," p. 609,
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restricts access by non-network groups to desirable evening 
time.
Option time was thus prohibited in an effort to 
correct the competitive imbalance between networks and their 
affiliates and increase the diversity of program sources. 
Prohibiting option time, however, has had no noticeable 
effect on the amount of network time cleared by affiliates. 
Due to the high costs of local live programing, licensees 
have received larger cunounts of income merely by riding the 
networks. Furthermore, although network affiliation con­
tracts are for two-year periods, networks typically review 
a station's record of delayed (recorded and then run at a 
more convenient time) and non-cleared programs to determine 
whether it would be in the interest of the network to affil­
iate with another station in the area.
The elimination of option time has not made more time 
available for non-network programs and has not increased 
competitive program sources in the interest of program 
diversity, since the profit-maximizing television station 
finds that it is economically advantageous to clear most
^®FCC, Annual Report. 1963,  p .  71.
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47network programs. Thus the "prime-time access rule" was 
initiated.
The Prime-Time Access Rule
This rule provides that after September 1, 1971, no 
television station, assigned to any of the top-fifty markets 
in which there are three or more operating commercial tele­
vision stations, shall broadcast network progreuos offered by 
any television network or networks for a total of more than 
three hours per day between the hours of 6 p.m. and 10 p.m. 
(central standard time). The rule exempts special news 
programs dealing with fast-breaking news events, on-the-spot 
coverage of news events, and political broadcasts by legally 
qualified candidates for public office. But stations are 
forbidden from scheduling syndicated programs which are 
merely reruns of old networks shows, and they are prohibited 
from scheduling motion pictures previously shown on tele­
vision.
The objective of the FCC is to provide the opportunity 
"for competitive development of alternative sources of tele­
vision programs" so that affiliates will have more than a
^^FCC, Reports, Vol. 23, May 29, 1970-July 17, 1970,
p. 396.
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"nominal choice" in selecting programs and independent
48stations will have new sources of syndicated prograuaing.
The action of the Commission was based on the 
following facts. At the beginning of 1970, almost seventy 
per cent of the television stations in the top-50 markets 
were network affiliates, and the figure was eighty-seven 
per cent for the country as a whole. Out of a total of 
twenty-eight hours between 6 p.m. and 10 p.m., network affil­
iates only carried an average of between 3.3 and 4.7 hours of 
non-network programing a week. Out of the twenty-one hours 
between 6:30 p.m. and 9:30 p.m., the figure was between 1.2 
and 1.6 hours. And non-network programing increasingly 
consisted of off-network programs.
Between 6 p.m. and 10 p.m. during scunple weeks in 1958 
and 1968, all stations in the top-50 markets decreased first- 
run syndicated entertainment series from 1065 to 833 half- 
hours, despite an increase in the number of stations. In 
contrast, off-network entertainment series increased from 136 
to 916 half-hours. The statistics for affiliated stations 
show the same decrease. Between 5 p.m. and 10 p.m., the 
average weekly station hours of first-run syndicated progreuns
^®FCC, Annual Report, 1970, p. 38.
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decreased from 4.15 in 1958 to 1.55 in 1968, while off- 
network programs increased from 0.52 to 1.79. The picture 
was the same for independent stations, which should be the 
backbone of the syndication market. Between 5 p.m. and 
10 p.m., the average weekly station hours of first-run 
syndicated programs decreased from 10,95 in 1958 to 8.54 in 
1968, while off-network programs increased from 0,87 to 
11.02.^ ®
The three national television networks vritually 
control the entire network program production process from 
idea through exhibition. The share of all network evening 
program hours either produced or directly controlled by net­
works increased from 67.2 to 96.7 per cent between 1957 and 
1968. Programs produced by independent producers dropped 
from 32.8 to 3.3 per cent between the same two years.
This increase in network control over programing has 
both fostered and been fostered by a change in the type of 
advertising and the length of programs, as well as by the 
desire to increase profits. There has been a decrease in 
program sponsorship and an increase in spot announcements of
^^See Table 22.
^^See Table 23.
126
TABLE 22
AVERAGE WEEKLY STATION HOURS FOR SYNDICATED 
AND OFF-NETWORK PROGRAMS IN THE TOP-FIFTY 
MARKETS FROM 5 to 10 p.m.,
1958 and 1968
Independent Affiliated
1958 1968 1958 1968
Syndicated 10.95 8.54 4.15 1.55
Off-Network 0.87 11.02 0.52 1.79
Source; FCC, Reports. Vol. 23, May 29, 1970- 
July 17, 1970, pp. 385-386.
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t a b l e 23
SOURCES OF PRIME-TIME PROGRAMS 
CARRIED ON NETWORKS,
1957 AND 1968
Three Networks Combined
1957
(Per Cent)
1968
(1) Network Produced 28.7 16.3
(2) Network Participation* 38.5 80.4
(1) and (2) Combined 67.2 96.7
(3) Independently Produced 32.8 3.3
♦Produced by others and licensed to networks.
Source: FCC# Reports# Vol. 23# May 29# 1970-July 17#
1970# p. 389.
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several advertisers within a single program. This is said 
to spread the financial risks in the use of television and 
improve cost effectiveness. Furthermore, the high and 
increasing costs of a program venture exclude most adver­
tisers from sponsoring it alone.
Almost 90 per cent of evening network time is sold in 
the form of spots. Evening program segments of one hour or 
more increased from 30.1 per cent in 1957 to 76.7 per cent 
in 1968. Half-hour programs decreased from 66.7 per cent in 
1957 to 23.3 per cent in 1968.^^
The loss of a syndication sub-industry over the years 
is best explained by the growth in the use of network time 
by major stations throughout the country, amd the resulting 
lack of prime-time on affiliated stations. A thriving syn­
dication industry producing prime-time quality programs must 
have an adequate base of stations to use its service. Since 
stations in the top-50 markets reach over seventy-five per 
cent of the television audience, access to these markets is 
essential to form such a base. A result of the decreasing 
market for syndicated shows is that independent stations,
^^ADL Report, Table 4, p. 10. Reported in FCC, 
Reports, Vol. 23, May 29, 1970-July 17, 1970, p. 390.
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many of which are UHF, have had difficulty in locating prime­
time quality sources of programs at reasonable costs. Their 
inferior status has thus been multiplied by an inability to 
present entertainment comparable to affiliated stations, and 
something less than a competitive national television service 
has resulted. A further result is that programing has been 
less diverse than may be expected from a more independent 
position of producers of programs.
The principle concern of the Commission in passing 
the prime-time access rule involved the shift from a situa­
tion in which almost thirty-three per cent of all regularly 
scheduled prime -time programs were provided to the networks 
by advertisers via independent producers, to the condition 
prevailing in 1968 when only three per cent of network pro­
grams were supplied by independent producers. However, such 
a rule is not an effective means to the end of program 
diversity.
The lack of diversity in progreuning which results from 
a three-network market is attributable to the Commission's 
allocation of the spectrum. A large percentage of television 
homes are unable to receive four competing commercial sig­
nals, and a fourth network cannot hope to con^ete under these
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conditions. Since program costs dominate total network 
costs, a fourth network would have to incur costs per home 
significantly in excess of the existing firms and signifi­
cantly above average revenues per home.
Networks compete somewhat rigorously for viewers.
The popularity and following of particular programs is of 
prime concern, and raiding by one network of another's pro­
grams has been done. Since competition focuses on maximiza­
tion of audience share, a network cannot be eiqiected to air
many programs which would not attract at least one-third of 
52the audience. Thus network programing does not produce a 
great deal of variety.
Is the prime-time access rule the answer to creating 
greater diversity of programing? Certainly not. The effect 
of limiting network offerings to stations to three prime­
time hours is that more time will be available to the 
syndication market. The total quantitative effect is not 
a small one in terms of hours opened up to alternative pro­
gram sources. The qualitative effect probably will be.
There is no reason to e3q>ect a significant number of 
stations to incur the high costs of local programing. These
52
This fact will be developed more fully in the next 
chapter since it is at the crux of the problem at hand.
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hours will be filled by programing similar to that offered 
by the networks, but it will involve lower production costs 
per program. This can be expected since the national sale 
of programs through networks allows significant economies 
in selling commercial time to sponsors, and in distributing 
progrcims and commercial announcements. Since regional and 
local brokers will now come into play, transaction costs 
will rise. Such increasing costs will have to be offset by 
a lowering of program quality. The Commission will thus 
have diverted resources from the production of programs to 
the distribution of them.
Networks became more involved in programing in order 
to serve as brokers for small as well as large advertisers 
who wished national coverage, and in doing so, increased the 
demand for network services. Such free market alterations 
appear to overshadow any means the Commission might use to 
increase program diversity, since independent syndicators 
operating through regional and local brokers will become, in 
effect, a fourth network. The only effect of the new policy, 
however, will be more expensive program distribution, more
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cumbersome advertising sales, and a reduction in program
53
production expenditures.
The major problem with the prime-time access rule, 
assuming it will foster increased sources of syndicated pro­
graming, is that it, like the Blue Book, the development of 
UHF television, the multiple ownership rules, and the out­
lawing of option time, will not necessarily promote real 
diversity in programing. If this is the real purpose of the 
Commission, a different economic base for program presenta­
tion must be encouraged. The recent decision of the Commis­
sion to encourage the origination of programing by subscrip­
tion television stations may be thé most importcint step 
along the road to increased program diversity in the tele­
vision broadcasting industry. The economics of subscription 
television as a supplement to commercial television and a 
means to program diversity is the topic of the next chapter.
^^See Robert W. Crandall, "The Economic Effect of 
Television-Network Program Ownership," Journal of Law and 
Economics, XIV (October, 1971), pp. 393 and 406-408.
CHAPTER IV 
SUBSCRIPTION TELEVISION
Broadcast regulation has from the beginning sought to 
promote a balanced and diversified program service through 
licensing-allocation policies geared to alter industry 
structure and conduct. Balance refers to the industry's 
product mix as among national, regional, and local program­
ing and time sales, and as cunong entertainment, advertising, 
news, public affairs, and other progreum types. Diversity
refers to the range of viewer choice within each of these 
1
categories. A distinction is made between increasingly 
diversity (adding more serious drama, serious music, ballet, 
art, etc., to the light entertainment programing which cur­
rently predominates) and increasing quantity (further choice 
within the restricted entertainment universe of commercial 
television). The concept of diversity is not to be confused
^Harvey J. Levine, "Broadcast Structure, Technology, 
and the ABC-ITT Merger Decision," Law and Contemporary 
Problems. XXXIV (Summer, 1969), p. 452.
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with an attempt to measure or influence program quality, a 
difficult job and one bordering on limiting freedom of 
speech.
Television broadcasting has been called **a vast 
wasteland, " primarily because of its lack of program diver­
sity, Duplication is a result of competition for viewers, 
and there is a great deal of duplication in types of pro­
grams on commercial television. This duplication “tends to 
inject a sense of economic inflation into the medium, for
2
which the advertiser and, ultimately, the consumer pays.”
One recent study defined twenty different categories 
of programs such as feature films, variety, news, dramatic 
adventure, dreunatic comedy, documentaries, fine arts, sports, 
etc. A cross-section study of fifty-nine television markets 
indicated that during the 6 p.m. to 11 p.m. period, as the 
number of stations in a market rose from one to five to ten, 
the average number of different kinds of programs available 
per half-hour only rose from 1 to 3.61 to 6.05. For all 
viewing hours, it was found that as the number of stations 
increased from one to five to ten, the average number of
Stanley T. Donner, The Meaning of Commercial Televi­
sion (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1967), p. 29.
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different kinds of programs available per half-hour only 
increased from 1 to 3.10 to 4.38. As the number of stations 
increases, the number of types of programs available increases 
at a decreasing rate.^ Adding commercial stations results 
in more programs of the same type offered by existing sta­
tions, rather than a real increase in choice through diversi­
fied programing.
Although television viewing is at an all-time high, 
the problem remains that television is not appealing equally 
to all segments of the population. Three-fourths of the
4
viewing is done by forty per cent of the viewers. Moreover, 
an average of only 62.7 per cent of the television households 
turns on their set during prime-time hours.^
Since commercial television is supported by the 
advertising dollar, it is an economic fact that diversity in 
programing cannot be substantially greater than the diversity 
of commercial interest in reaching a limited audience.® The
^Douglas W. Webbink, "The Impact of UHF Promotion:
The All-Channel Television Receiver Law, " Law and Contempo­
rary Problems. XXXIV (Summer, 1969), pp. 549-550.
4
Donner, Meaning of Commercial Television, p. 34.
^Television Magazine, May, 1965, p. 32.
^Roscoe L. Barrow, "The Attainment of Balanced Program 
Sercice in Television," Virginia Law Review, LII (January, 
1966), p. 638.
136
influence of the advertising function has been to bring 
about a serious imbalance in television programing. Gresham’s 
law operates in television broadcasting to drive out programs 
of interest to substantial minority audiences and to bring
7
in those attracting the maximum number of viewers. As a 
result, a subsidy accrues to those who derive satisfaction 
from television service. This subsidy comes from the higher 
prices that must be paid for advertised products by minority
g
groups who are not catered for on commercial television.
The preceding chapter showed that the structure of 
the television broadcasting industry is such that government 
regulation has failed to achieve the objective of increased 
diversity in programing, and further regulation is not 
likely to foster increased diversity in the future. The 
result is that the economic welfare accruing to society from 
television broadcasting is not optimum since a substantial 
portion of the population is not adequately being served.
Two alternatives exist as solutions to this problem.
One is complete government operation of the industry, 
converting the product of the industry (the television
^Ibid.. p. 635.
8
This argument was developed in Chapter Two.
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program) from a private good to a public good. The second 
alternative, and the one advocated in this chapter, is the 
introduction of subscription television as a supplement to 
commercial television.
Alternative One;
Government Operation of the Industry
Complete government operation of the industry as a 
solution to the problem of program diversity would imply that 
the government should diversify programing by its own stan­
dards of judgment and supply advertiser-supported and/or 
taxpayer-supported programing at a "zero” price to the 
viewer. Consider the rationality for such an alternative.
Let A be a public good privately supplied. Let B, C, 
D, and so on be private goods privately supplied. For many 
consumers, the marginal, utility of a dollar's worth of good 
A may be so low that they will not purchase it at a con^et- 
itively determined price. That is, even though the marginal 
utility of the good is not zero.
MOg MUg MÜJJ
, etc.
^A
The consumer will not purchase the public good at its com­
petitive price, although he would at lower prices (to a limit
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of a zero price). If a zero price were established, such 
individuals would consume the public good. They would be 
better off, and no one would be worse off since no more of 
society's resources are used when they consume it. Thus it 
is reasonable to argue that television broadcasting be 
publicly supplied.
In such a situation, the government, rather than 
profit-maximizing entrepreneurs, would dictate programing 
decisions. This would, perhaps, result in a more diversified 
program fare than currently exists in television since it 
could be assumed that the government would operate the indus­
try with some goals other than profit maximization given first 
priority. This alternative is rejected for two reasons.
First, it is not in line with the philosophy of the 
economic system prevailing in the United States where the 
role of the government as a supplier is limited to markets in 
which the price system does not allocate resources efficiently. 
Second, there is no economic criteria (only value 
judgments) that would allow one to decide whether or not the 
overall effect of such a structural change would benefit 
society. More specifically, it would be difficult to measure 
the cost to those who would lose programing which they cur­
rently enjoy with the benefits that would accrue to those
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(minorities) not currently being served. Such an alternative 
places strong confidence in the government and its (value) 
judgments as to what would constitute an improved program 
fare.
Alternative Two;
Subscription Television
The second alternative is to alter the current 
structure of the industry by allowing the private (but regu­
lated) market to supply free (advertiser-supported) television 
progrcuning and to permit a positive price to be set on some 
television broadcasting, thereby segmenting the market for 
television programs. It will be shown that such market 
segmenting will offer substantial benefits and will increase 
the economic welfare of society.
Much of what has been written during the past two 
decades has concentrated on the social and cultural inç>lica- 
tions of subscription television (sometimes referred to as 
STV). Little has been said about its economic possibilities. 
Before analyzing STV in its economic setting, some intro­
ductory comments concerning the history and nature of STV 
are in order.
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Historical Development of STV 
Disagreement over the proper source of revenue for 
broadcast stations is not a recent phenomenon. Prior to the 
passage of the Communications Act of 1934, individuals had 
urged that radio broadcasting be kept free of advertising.
A subscription television system was even envisioned by the 
pioneers of television as well as the critics of radio 
advertising. But, as mentioned in Chapter I, television 
was destined to follow in the commercial footsteps of its 
predecessor.
Acting under Section 303 of the Communications Act
which requires it to "study new uses of radio, provide for
e}q>erimental uses of frequencies, and generally encourage
the larger and more effective use of radio in the public 
9
interest, " the PCC authorized preliminary over-the-air 
subscription television ejqperimentation as early as 1950.
In that year the Skiatron system was tested over WOR-TV,
New York City. In 1951, the Telemeter system was tested 
over KTLA-TV, Los Angeles, and Zenith tested its system over
^U.S. Congress, Communications Act of 1934, Section
303 .
141
its own experimental station in C h i c a g o . T h e s e  tests were 
made without general public participation.
On February 10, 1955, the Commission instituted a 
proceeding to determine whether television stations should 
be authorized to transmit programs to be paid for on a sub­
scription basis (Docket 11279). On October 17, 1957, the 
Commission adopted its First Report in the subscription 
television proceeding in which it indicated that applications 
to conduct trial operations would be considered if prescribed 
conditions were met. In that respect, the Commission held 
that trial operations were necessary to: (1) enable the
public to register its own judgment on such a service; (2) 
obtain information concerning the competitive impact of 
subscription television upon the "free" system; (3) obtain 
operating information concerning the need to standardize 
technical equipment and methods; and (4) determine whether 
such a service would require additional controls, including 
possible amendments to the Communications Act.
In a Second Report issued on February 27, 1958, the 
Commission deferred action on applications for trial
^®The various systems differ mainly in the way the 
transmissions are scrambled and unscrambled and whether coin 
boxes, punch cards, or tape cure used to bill subscribers.
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operations until after the close of the 85th Congress in 
order to afford Congress an opportunity to consider pending 
legislation on the matter. On July 23, 1958, the Commission 
continued the status quo so that the first session of the 
86th Congress could resume consideration of the subject. No 
national laws affecting STV were then or have since been 
adopted.
After further consideration of the matter, the 
Commission issued a Third Report on March 24, 1959, indicat­
ing that it was prepared to consider any subscription tele­
vision application by a commercial television station (or by 
an appliccuit for a commercial television station) which 
conformed with revised requirements set out in the report.
On June 22, 1960, mirtford Phonevision Company 
(later RMO General Phonevision Company), licensee of WHCT-TV, 
channel 18, Hartford, Connecticut, applied for authorization 
to conduct a trial subscription television operation. The 
station began such operations on June 29, 1962, and con­
cluded them in January, 1969. In 1962, the Commission 
authorized a public test of subscription television by RTCO- 
TV, channel 2, Denver, but the project was never started.
^^FCC, Subscription Television, Washington, D.C., 
December, 1970, pp. 4-7. (Mimeographed.)
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A third application was filed in 1963 by KVUE-TV, channel 40, 
Sacramento. However, it was returned as unacceptable since 
it failed to comply with the conditions for trial opera­
tions.^^
The most promising but disheartening trial came in 
Los Angeles. Just as the operation appeared to become a 
success, broadcasters and motion picture ejdiibitors forced a 
repeal referendum onto the 1964 California ballot and con­
vinced the public to vote against subscription television.
The Supreme Court declared the referendum illegal two years 
later, but the California company had already gone bankrupt.
A Fourth Report, adopted on December 12, 1968, 
established over-the-air subscription television as a supple­
mental broadcast service. The new rules governing the service 
(other than technical standards) became effective on June 12, 
1969. Technical standards were adopted on September 4, 1969, 
in a Fifth Report.
Nature of STV
STV and CATV
STV is a method of distributing television programs 
to those who have subscribed and levying a monetary charge
12pcc, Annual Report. 1963, p. 69.
13
Time., December 27, 1968, pp. 58-59.
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upon the subscriber for the reception of each individual 
performance. Charges vary from program to program and are 
the sola source of station revenue from the program. In 
contrast, community antenna television (CATV) systems are 
not broadcast stations since they merely receive and ampli^ 
the transmissions of television broadcast stations and then 
redistribute the signals by cable to subscribers for a 
fixed (usually monthly) fee.
CATV is relatively more important in smaller markets
than in larger ones, where all three networks can be received
off-the-air. About eighty per cent of the CATV systems have
14
fewer than 2000 subscribers. STV, however, is feasible 
only in relatively large markets where the potential number 
of subscribers is significantly large.
Many viewers who can receive one or two television 
signals with grade A clarity from their own area stations 
pay the monthly CATV fee in order to expand their choice to 
more than one or two stations. The rapid expansion of CATV 
in recent years offers viable support for the proposition 
that consumers are willing to pay not only for improved
14See T a b le  24 .
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TABLE 24
CATV SYSTEMS BY SUBSCRIBER SIZE, 
AS OF MARCH 15, 1971
Subscriber Size Systems
20,QUO and over 12
10,000 - 19,999 60
5.000 - 9,999 176
3,500 - 4,999 120
2.000 - 3,499 338
1.000 - 1,999 462
500 - 999 476
50 - 499 731
49 and under 34
Not Available 169
Source: Television Digest, Inc., Televi­
sion Factbook, 1971-1972, p. 81-a,
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reception of television signals, but also for an expanded 
program fare.
The "freeze" on television licenses imposed by the 
Commission from 1948 to 1952 had the effect of limting the 
number of television stations to those already in operation 
as of September, 1948. CATV systems were born of a desire 
by people in small and isolated communities to obtain tele­
vision service. The first systems were established largely 
by local enterprise in areas unable to support a local 
station and beyond the signal range of outside stations.
As early as 1949, a pioneer community antenna was 
tested at Astoria, Oregon, and the-first commercial CATV 
system was started the following year in Lansford, Pennsyl­
vania.^^ At the end of 1970, 2570 CATV systems were in 
operation. At that time, there were 60,929,000 television 
households in the United States, of which 5,300,000 or 9 per 
cent, were subscribers to a cable s y s t e m , O v e r  the past 
decade, the number of subscribers has increased at an aver­
age annual rate of about 21 per cent, and the number of
ISpcc, Annual Report, 1965, p. 78. 
IGsee Table 25.
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TABLE 25
CATV SYSTEMS AND SUBSCRIBERS, 
JANUARY 1, 1952-1971
Year Operating Systems Total Subscribers
1952 70 14,000
1953 150 30,000
1954 300 65,000
1955 400 150,000
1956 450 300,000
1957 500 350,000
1958 525 450,000
1959 560 550,000
1960 640 650,000
1961 700 725,000
1962 800 850,000
1963 1000 950,000
1964 1200 1,085,000
1965 1325 1,275,000
1966 1570 1,575,000
1967 1770 2,100,000
1968 2000 2,800,000
1969 2260 3,600,000
1970 2490 4,500,000
1971 2570 5,300,000
Source: Television Digest, Inc., Television Factbook. 1971-
1972, p. 81-a.
148
systems has grown at an annual rate of approximately 14 per 
cent.
Whereas early systems offered programs over only two
or three channels, today the majority of systems offer
17between six and twelve channel choices. The average sub­
scriber pays about $5 per month for the service in addition 
to an initial installation charge. Although such installa­
tion charges can be as high as $175, they typically are 
about $20,
Delivery of STV Programs
Two technically feasible methods of program delivery 
have been devised: the airwave system and the closed circuit
or wire system. The airwave system transmits programs con­
ventionally? however, the visual signal is scrambled to 
prevent reception by non-subscribers. Decoders, attachable 
to any standard television receiver, unscramble the distorted 
picture.. The wire system delivers the program through a 
coctxial cable connected to the subscriber's television 
receiver by means of "drop lines." The programs are fed 
into a program selector attached to the set.
^^See T a b le  26 .
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TABLE 26
CHANNEL CAPACITY OF EXISTING CATV SYSTEMS, 
MARCH 15, 1971
Channel
Capacity
Number of 
Systems
Over 12 157
6 - 1 2 1882
Only 5 371
Less than 5 50
Not Available 118
Source; Television Digest, Inc., Television 
Factbook, 1971-1972, p. 66-a.
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The most significant characteristic differentiating 
the two systems is that of cost, both initially and during 
operation. The airwave system requires a relatively small 
capital outlay, and a conventional television station can 
scramble its signal at a relatively small cost. The only 
major expense is the manufacture and installation of decoders, 
at a cost of less than one hundred dollars each. In contrast, 
the installation of a wire system entails a large initial 
capital investment, and rental rates for the use of telephone 
poles are almost prohibitive in themselves. Furthermore, 
there is the cost of manufacture and installation of pro­
gram selectors. The airwave system has distinct economic 
advantages, and thus was adopted in 1969 by the FCC.
In addition to its economic advantages, the airwave 
system permits access to a substantially larger subscriber 
area. A decoder can be installed on any set capable of 
receiving the signal of the station. The market of the wire 
system, however, is limited to those areas where cable has 
been laid.
Existing CATV systems can readily receive the 
scrcuribled television signal; and since it will be received 
and retransmitted in scrambled form, CATV will serve its
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function as a means of improved reception and will not 
interfere with (but complement) STV.
Feasibility of STV 
A subscription television station is feasible only if 
its programing is such that a sufficient number of house­
holds choose to become subscribers in order to support the 
station (and allow it to earn an economic profit). Zenith 
has estimated that an STV station would break even with
20,000 subscribers spending an average of $65 per year for
18programs and $39 for decoder rental. If the number of
subscribers is more, or the average program expenditure is
higher, the business will show profits as indicated in
Table 27. With a fifty per cent penetration, STV could break
even (at least) in the top-200 markets. With twenty per cent
penetration, STV could break even in 170 markets. With ten
per cent, STV could operate in 91 markets; with five per
cent, it would operate in 46 markets; and with three per
19cent, STV could exist in 20 markets.
The national average station rate for prime time is 
$3 per minute per 1000 homes. Thus, a program one hour in
^®FCC, Reports. Vol. 15, November 15, 1968-January 31, 
1969, p. 591.
^^Ibid., p. 592.
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TABLE 27
SUMMARY OP STV PROJECTIONS BY ZENITH-TECO
Number of Subscribers 
and Average Program 
Expenditure Per Year
Sales Cost Profit
(Thousands) (Thousands) (Thousands)
20,000 Subscribers
$65 per year $ 2,120 $ 2,711 $ 1
$75 per year 2,320 • 2,711 119
40,000 Subscribers
$65 per year 4,240 5,393 619
$75 per year 4,640 5,393 855
75,000 Subscribers
$65 per year 7,950 10,087 1,780
$75 per year 8,700 10,087 2,223
100,000 Subscribers
$65 per year 10,600 13,441 2,591
$75 per year 11,600 13,441 3,181
Source; FCC, Reports, Vol. 15, November 15, 1968-January 31, 
1969, p. 591.
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length delivering 1000 homes and having 16 commercial 
minutes would produce, on an average, $48. At a rate of 
less than $ .05 per hour per set, STV could generate $48 
per thousand homes per hour; at $ .50 per hour, STV could 
make an equal return with free television with only one- 
tenth the audience.
Many who watch television are not completely 
satisfied. But who are these 37.3 per cent that do not cur­
rently watch television, but perhaps would with improved 
programing, and thereby serve as a substantial prospective 
STV audience? Besides those who find current programing 
unworthy of the time spent viewing, there are others who 
would prefer for various reasons to remain at home for 
entertainment given improved programing, A trip to the 
movie theater (or other entertainment) involves indirect 
costs in addition to the tickets, such as transportation, 
parking charges, babysitting fees, adverse weather condi­
tions, etc. The average motion picture is seen by only five 
per cent of the population; a major picture is viewed by
only eight per cent or, in rare cases, ten per cent of the 
20population. The average family of four going to the 
^°Ibid.. p. 482.
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movies twice a month at $1 a ticket spends $96 a year, not 
counting indirect costs and the price of popcorn. At a rate 
of $ .50 per hour, this family could watch 192 hours of 
programing on STV (for $96), equivalent in time to 96 two- 
hour movies. Such additions to the box office potential of 
a film would serve to increase the quality and quantity of 
movies.
STV will open up opportunities for new writers, 
producers, directors, and actors by co-sponsoring new pro­
ductions. A typical Broadway show that runs a year in a 
theater of 1200 seats with every performance sold out is 
seen by 499,200 persons. Many of the ten million residents 
of New York or the millions of persons in the rest of the 
country would like to see the show but cannot because of
distance or cost. STV may therefore stimulate an additional
21
quantity of Broadway plays, operas, and so forth.
It was mentioned in Chapter Two that 64.8 per cent 
of all UHF stations are unprofitable. While only 48.9 per 
cent of the network affiliated UHF stations are unprofitcible,
95.8 per cent of the independent UHF stations are losing
22 ___
money. This means that many currently operating UHF
^^Ibid. ^^See Table 20.
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stations are potential candidates for STV if and when they 
are convinced that such an operation would be profitable. 
The plight of UHF was methodically charted by the giants of 
the television industry in order to reduce competition and 
enhance profits. STV offers a means by which UHF stations 
can strike back, in the interest of the public, in the 
interest of competition, and in the interest of themselves.
It may be preferable at first for existing UHF 
stations to become subscription stations, since the only 
capital outlays necessary would be a scrambler for the sta­
tion and a decoder for each subscribing home. Thus STV 
would not be stunted in its early growth by the esqpense of 
constructing new stations.
With respect to the programing, loss of money, and
23poor penetration rate of the Hartford STV trial, the Com­
mission has recognized that there were problems in the 
limited trial which would not necessarily result on a
23The trial, which commenced in 1962 and ceased 
operations in 1969, did not provide the diversity of pro­
graming that STV had promised, never became profitable, 
losing over $3*5 million in the first three years of opera­
tion, and never achieved over one per cent penetration. 
However, company executives expected to lose money on the 
trial, and made it clear that the objectives of the trial 
were to obtain operating experience. FCC, Reborfs. Vol. 
15, p. 489.
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nationwide basis. The FCC agreed with the proponents of STV
that "nothing in the Act indicates that establishment of a
new service must be preceded by absolute proof that it will
be viable, and that authorizing a new service does not
24require evidence of a widespread public demand." Such 
proof was not made when the Commission allocated space for 
UHF or when it reserved channels for educational television 
in 1952. And there was no great demand for FM or television 
services when they commenced. In fact, the National Associ­
ation of Broadcasters prophesized doom for commercial 
television before it grew from 8500 television homes to 
95 per cent of all homes in the nation.
The Hartford trial did underline the fact that STV 
has broad appeal, particularly to the middle- and lower- 
income families: 43 per cent of the subscribers had average
annual incomes between $4000 and $7000; 85 per cent had
25average annual incomes of $10,000 or less.
FCC Constraints
STV poses a fundamental competitive challenge to the 
present system of advertiser-supported networks and stations.
^^Ibid., p. 491.
25
Broadcasting, June 16, 1969, p. 61,
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To guard against allowing serious conflicts of interest to 
retard the further development of networks and stations and 
to allow speedy integration of STV into the ongoing struc­
ture, a number of limitations governing the operation of 
STV stations were written into the 1969 rules for the 
service.
In order that STV will be a supplement and not a
replacement for commercial television, only one station will
be allowed in any area and only in a community which is
within the grade A service contours of at least four other
26commercial television stations. Thus, the consumer will 
not be forced to pay directly for television programing 
unless he so desires. The typical consumer will not be 
willing to pay for what he is currently able to receive 
free, so competition will force subscription stations to 
diversify their programing if they are to survive.
Because STV is a more efficient mechanism with 
respect to requiring individuals to pay for what they watch, 
the FCC feared that STV would be able to outbid commercial 
television for the most popular programs. The resulting 
audience diversion from "free" television would reduce the
^Ggee T ab le  28 .
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TABLE 28
MARKETS RECEIVING AT LEAST POUR CHANNELS
NEW ENGLAND; Boston, Hartford-New Haven, Providence-New 
Bedford,
MIDDLE ATLANTIC: Albany-Schenectady-Troy, Buffalo,
Harrisburg-Lancaster, Johnstown-Altoona, New York City, 
Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Rochester, Syracuse, Wilkes- 
Barre-Scranton.
SOUTH ATLANTIC: Atlanta, Baltimore, Charleston-Huntington,
Greensboro-Winston-Salera, Greenville-Spartanburg, 
Jacksonville, Miami, Norf olk-Portsmouth, Orlando- 
Daytona Beach, Richmond, Roanoke-Lynchburg, Tampa, 
Washington.
NORTH CENTRAL; Cape Girardeau, Cedar Rapids-Waterloo, 
Champaign-Decatur, Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleveland, 
Davenport-Rock Island, Daytoni Des Moines, Detroit, 
Duluth-Superior, Flint-Saginaw-Fay City, Gremd Rapids- 
Kalamazoo, Indianapolis, Kansas City, La Crosse-Eau 
Claire, Lincoln-Hastings-Kearney, Milwaukee, Minneap­
olis, Minot-Bismarck, Omaha, St. Louis, Toledo, 
Wichita.
SOUTH CENTRAL; Birmingham, Dallas-Fort Worth, El Paso, 
Houston, Louisville, Memphis, Mobile-Pensacola, 
Nashville, New Orleans, Odessa-Midland, Oklahoma City, 
San Antonio, Shreveport, Tulsa, Waco-Temple, Wichita 
Falls-Lawton.
FAR WEST; Albuquerque, Boise-Nampa, Colorado Springs- 
Pueblo, Denver, Idaho Falls-Pocatello, Los Angeles, 
Phoenix, Portland, Reno, Sacramento-Stockton, Salinas- 
Monterey, Salt Lake City, Ogden-Provo, San Francisco- 
Oakland, Seattle-Tacoma, Spokane, Tucson.
Sources H.S. News & World Report, March 16, 1970, p. 85.
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advertising revenues of "free" television and thereby reduce 
its buying power. To prevent the so-called siphoning of 
programing from commercial television, STV stations are pre­
cluded from the use of feature films more than two years 
old except for those that are unavailable to conventional 
television, and a limited number (up to twelve per year) of 
films over ten years old. Furthermore, any sports event 
regularly broadcast over conventional television in a com­
munity within two years preceding the proposed STV broadcast 
may not be shown on S T V , a n d  series types of programs with 
interconnected plots or substantially the same casts may not 
be broadcast on STV.
STV stations are required to broadcast at least the 
minimum number of hours of nonsubscription free programing 
required of all television stations, and commercials are 
prohibited on STV broadcasts. To assure some program 
diversity, no more than ninety per cent of STV broadcast 
time may be devoted to feature films and sports.
The Commission has chosen not to regulate subscriber 
rates, but charges, terms, and conditions of service must
27Of prime interest in this connection, however, would 
be the possibility of broadcasting sporting events now 
"blacked out” in specific areas.
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be applied uniformly. Decoders must be leased, not sold, to
28subscribers. The large expenditures which the public has
been forced to make by the 1962 all-channel receiver law in
2Qan effort to promote UHF television fortunately will not 
be repeated in promoting subscription television. All 
necessary equipment conducive to such a system will be owned 
by the station itself, and a subscription to such a system 
is entirely voluntary.
Economic Rationality of STV
In order to consider the rationality of directly 
charging consumers for viewing television on a per program 
basis, the unit of output needs to be defined more e:8q)licitly. 
The relevant unit of output for a subscription station is 
the service of a series of noncommercial television programs. 
The price charged for viewing each program varies and is 
based upon the cost of presenting the program. The
28
FCC, Annual Report, 1969, pp. 40-41.
^^See Chapter Three.
^^At some later stage, it may be in the public inter­
est to permit the sale of decoders, since a continued leas­
ing requirement could mean that subscribers would pay more 
in rental fees than it would cost to buy the decoding equip­
ment. The Commission's intent for the present is to protect 
subscribers against obsolescence or cessation of service.
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Sainuelson-Minasian debate analyzed the rationality of 
charging a positive price for television programing.
Almost two decades ago. Professor Samuelson 
classified television broadcasting as a public good, since 
each individual’s consumption of it leads to no subtraction 
from any other individual’s consumption of that good.^^
Since the marginal cost of providing a television signal to 
an extra family (excepting decoder charges) is zero, a sub­
scription television system charging a positive price for a 
program would appear to violate the Paretian optimality 
principle that goods should be priced at their marginal 
costs,
According to Professor Minasian, such a use of the 
optimality condition is unjustified since it uniformly 
defines all output combinations as optimal without any dis­
crimination. A pricing rule that takes as given the kinds 
of output should not be identified with the optimum principle 
for resource allocation. The optimization principle dictates 
the use of costs? the dictum that price should equal zero is
31
Paul A. Samuelson, “The Pure Theory of Public Ex­
penditures," Review of Economics and Statistics, XXXVI 
(November, 1954), pp. 387-389, and "Aspects of Public Expen­
diture Theories," Review of Economics and Statistics, XL 
(August, 1958), pp. 332-338.
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independent of the value of television output. In general,
the rule is applicable to the problem of rationing a given
output, but it is not useful in selecting those uses which
allow the value of television service to be maximized.
If, for example, STV increases the marginal utility derived
from viewing a television program more than it increases
the price, a condition closer to an optimum is fostered by
STV. Furthermore, a comparison of "free” television with
STV has economic meaning "only if both systems produce the
33same quality and quantity of programing." The FCC has 
provided in its rules governing STV that this will not be 
the case.
Cost of STV Output
With regard to the output to be priced, the costs 
implicit in a subscription television service can be divided 
into three types.
There is the cost of station construction and operation. 
This includes the cost of the transmitter, antenna, cameras,
32Jora R. Minasian, "Television Pricing and the 
Theory of Public Goods," Journal of Law and Economics, VII 
(October, 1964), pp. 72-73.
^^Ibid., p. 73.
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projectors, scrambler, etc. Also included are operational, 
maintenance, and administrative costs. If a microwave relay 
or coaxial cable are used to import signals, there will be 
payments to the common carrier. Such costs will be desig­
nated as type X and are independent of the number of 
subscribers.
There is the cost of producing or purchasing progrcuns. 
It is assumed that higher costs of production or procure­
ment imply higher quality programing which implies higher 
costs, but these costs are independent of the number of 
subscribers. Such programing costs will be denoted as type 
Y.
Regardless of whether the signal is transported 
over-the-air or by a CATV system or both, the third cost to 
the station is for decoders and their installation, mainte­
nance, and administration. The subscriber may choose to 
import signals via CATV. Nevertheless, a decoder will be 
necessary since the signal fed to the CATV antenna will be 
scrambled. This group of costs, denoted as type Z, will be 
borne entirely by subscribers through a (monthly) rental 
fee on decoders.
Cost X is a purely fixed cost, and decreases with the 
number of viewers, cost Y is a variable cost, and increases
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with the quality of programing. The economic cost (price 
less profit) of a program can then be written as;
C(P) =
V P
where V denotes the estimated number of viewers of a given 
program and P denotes the number of programs viewed during 
any given month.
Benefits of STV 
As a supplement to commercial television, STV is 
accepted for two reasons as a superior means of allowing 
television to more optimally serve the public than either 
continued regulation of the current structure or complete 
government operation of the industry.
First, STV will provide a more direct and persuasive 
index of the set owners' program preferences than the rating 
services. Second, STV will tend to promote a more differ­
entiated oligopoly through its efficient marketing process.
Provision of a Direct Index of 
Program Preferences
There are some basic differences between the process
of arriving at programing decisions under STV and under
"free" television. Before discussing these, it should be
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understood that conventional television is not free. The
viewer must invest in a television receiver, and then must
pay maintenance and operating c o s t s.Indirectly, the
viewer and the public in general pay for television broad-
35casting through higher prices on advertised products.
There is also an opportunity cost involved to the viewer 
and to society— the increased satisfaction or output which 
might have resulted had the individual chosen not to spend 
a given amount of time as a viewer.
The decision of whether or not to broadcast a program 
on commercial television is based on the potential audience,
34Since the beginning of television, the public has 
invested approximately $40 billion in television sets, as 
compared to approximately $300 million by the networks and 
their owned-and-operated stations and $1 billion by all 
other stations for physical facilities— about 1 per cent 
for networks and 4 per cent for stations of the public' s 
investment. (See Table 8.) Furthermore, the public's daily 
operating cost amounts to 25 cents per television home.
(See FCC, Reports, Vol. 23, May 29, 1970-July 17, 1970, 
p. 391.)
35
Advertisers spent $3,660 million for television 
advertising in 1970. (See Table 10.) Dividing that figure 
by the estimated 62,500,000 television households indicates 
that each household paid an average of $58.50. In reply to 
arguments that advertising benefits society by reducing 
production costs (via economies of scale), Harry J. Skornia 
says that any such economies are not reflected in lower 
prices and cites evidence where the opposite has occurred. 
(See Harry J. Skornia, Television and Society (New York; 
McGraw-Hill, 1965), pp. 88-119 and 205-210.)
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and the decision of whether or not to continue broadcasting 
a program is based on audience size as measured by the 
rating services.
There are several rating services, but as far as 
television is concerned, the A, C. Nielsen Company and the 
American Research Bureau (ARB) are the most significant. 
Nielsen measures the audience electronically using a device 
known as the "Audimeter. " When wired to a television set, 
it continuously records the channels that are tuned. It 
indicates the time a station was tuned, how long it remained 
in view, and when and for how long each change was made.
But the Audimeter does not record who or how many (if any) 
are viewing. It does not record the inqpression they get of 
the program. It does not indicate whether or not they like 
the program, or if they are on the telephone or reading while 
the set is on. Thus the Audimeter is merely a timekeeper, 
not a critic.
Nielsen Audimeters are attached to 1200 television 
sets in various parts of the country; there is approximately 
one Audimeter for every 52,000 television homes. If a set 
is tuned to a program for at least six minutes, the program 
is considered as "viewed. " Thus it is possible for Nielsen
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36to deliver a total audience rating of X for a program, 
wherein half of those sets belonged to people who watched 
six minutes, became disgusted, and tuned out. Nevertheless, 
they will become a part of the ratings, which will be 
delivered to networks, advertising agencies, and sponsors 
as validation of the premise that people are getting what 
they want.
The American Research Bureau places a viewer "diary" 
in 2200 homes. Unlike the Audimeter, the ARB diary allows 
the viewer to record who (age and sex) and how many (if any) 
view each program. However, the diary is not accurate 
unless the viewer records the information correctly. There 
is the possibility that the diary-keeper will forget to 
record all his viewing or that he will record his viewing 
in such a manner that it is appealing to ARB and its clients, 
That is, there is a chance that he will under-record or 
over-record.
There are other rating services (such as Trendex and 
Pulse) and procedures (such as telephone calls and personal
36A total audience rating of X for a given program 
indicates that X per cent of the television homes in the 
rated area were tuned to at least six minutes of this 
program.
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interviews), but all of these are accused of avoiding 
randomness in their sampling. As many as thirty per cent 
of the originally designated homes refuse to have Nielsen's 
Audimeter installed on their sets. ARB's diary-horaes (and 
Trendex's telephone calls) are selected from telephone 
directories, thus omitting the possibility of selecting a 
non-telephone or non-directory-listed home. Because only 
70 per cent of American homes can be reached through pub­
lished telephone directories, and because only 85 to 90 per 
cent of those who answer will cooperate, the effective 
information figure is 60 to 63 per cent, further diminished 
by the raters' exclusion of toll-call areas. Well-known 
problems arise with the personal interview method of Pulse, 
including interviewer or respondent errors, poorly formu­
lated questions, language difficulties, refusals to cooper­
ate, and absences from the home.^^
The major problem with the present rating process, 
other than its lack of randomness, is that the number of 
viewers, not the intensity of want, is relevant. What a 
viewer would be willing to pay for a program plays no part
3?Harold Mehling, The Great Time-Killer (Cleveland: 
World Publishing Co., 1962), pp. 233-234.
169
in determining what will be broadcast. Votes take a value 
of zero (a non-viewer) or one (a viewer) rather than a much 
wider range of values as measured by dollar votes. To what 
degree the viewer liked or disliked a particular program is 
unimportant— the ratings indicate only that he did or did 
not have his set tuned to it.
Thus, under the present system of television (1) 
there is no means which assures either that people who watch 
a program pay for it or that those who pay, pay according to 
what they feel it is worth and (2) the programing decisions 
of the industry reflect an effort to maximize the audience, 
but the viewer has no means of directly indicating his 
demand. He is forced to watch what others have chosen to 
broadcast (based on the rating services' reports) or turn 
off his set.
STV has a more efficient marketing process since:
(1) only those who view a program will support it and (2) 
in order to maximize profits, STV will show programs which 
the public will pay most to see (with their dollar votes) 
rather than the programs which, if free, would be watched 
by the largest number of people. Since an STV station must 
rely directly on subscribers for its revenue, the market
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test of programs will be a more direct indicator of consumer 
demands than is possible with the rating services.
Promotion of at Pifferentiated Oligopoly
When only a few firms provide a good or service to a 
market area, as in the case of television broadcasting, the 
market structure is defined as oligopoly. Such a market 
structure is the result of spectrum limitation (posing as a 
barrier to entry) and economies of scale so significant in 
the industry that a substantially larger number of firms 
(stations) could not supply the industry demand without
38incurring significantly higher average (per viewer) costs. 
Each of the firms in such a market structure must take 
account of the effects of its policies on rivals. When 
there is a homogeneous good or service provided, such mutual 
interdependence is more significant than when the goods or 
services provided are close, but not perfect substitutes. 
Television broadcasting, in its current structure, is a
38Two other explanations for the emergence of oli­
gopoly, although not applicable to television broadcasting, 
have been offered. Firms may find it to their advantage to 
eliminate competition by merger. And firms may secure 
absolute advantages in cost which permit them to operate 
profitably at a price at which others cannot survive. See 
Joe S. Bain, Pricing, Distribution,' and Employment' (New York: 
Henry Holt and Co., 1953), p. 271.
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differentiated oligopoly, but forces within the industrial 
structure tend toward the creation of a pure oligopoly as 
a result of the tendency toward program duplication.
Product differentiation, first emphasized as such by 
Chamberlin in the 1930's, refers in essence to preferences 
for one or some of a variety of similar goods or services. 
Although product differentiation is propagated by differ­
ences in the design or physical quality of competing products; 
by efforts of sellers to distinguish their products through 
packaging, branding, and the offering of auxiliary services 
to buyers; and by advertising and sales-promotional efforts 
designed to win the allegiance and custom of the potential 
buyer; the first of these is far more applicable to the 
television broadcasting industry (where differentiation 
occurs at all).
Chamberlin has argued that "differentiation is often 
conceived as describing the reprehensible creation by busi­
nessmen of purely factitious differences between products
39
which are by nature fundcunentally uniform." For example, 
although two detergents have different colors and different
39
E. H. Chamberlin, "Product Heterogeneity and Public 
Policy," American Economic Review, XL (May, 1950), p, 87.
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packaging, there may be no real cleaning-power difference 
between them. Since program differentiation in the televi­
sion industry as it exists today is likely to be more real 
than this, Chamberlin would probably prefer to apply the 
term "heterogeneous oligopoly'* (rather than differentiated 
oligopoly). Nevertheless, the tendency toward pure oligo­
poly still remains. Consider the explanation for such a 
tendency.
A mass audience is the most important element 
necessary for the continuation of a given program on commer­
cial television. If a given program commands less than one- 
third of the audience in a three-station market, there is a 
tendency for the station (or network) to produce a program 
more similar to that being telecast by one of the other (more 
popular) stations (or networks), thereby moving toward 
program duplication, less diversity, and (in the limit) a 
pure oligopoly. At times, such tendencies have taken the 
form of program siphoning, and movement of popular programs 
from one network to another or one station to another is 
common.
With respect to the viewer, television time as a 
service has a zero (direct) price, and the principal
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consequence of product differentiation— that the seller 
gains some independent jurisdiction over his price— is 
therefore not operative. It is when the advertiser, rather 
than the viewer, is considered the buyer (of time) that the 
tendencies toward a pure oligopoly are at work. Three 
national advertisers sponsoring a given segment of time on 
the three national networks would each, theoretically, 
obtain one-third of the audience if the identical program 
were shown on all three networks.
Consider a situation in which there are three (free) 
channels broadcasting to a population whose tastes vary in 
the following way: out of every 100 potential viewers, 80
want a program of type A, 18 want a program of type B, and 
the remaining 2 want a program of type C. Furthermore, 
assume that a viewer will turn on his set only if a program 
of the type he prefers is broadcast.
The three competing firms, each trying to maximize 
its audience, will probably all produce a program of type A 
since each one's share of the mass audience will be larger 
than the whole of the potential audience for programs of 
types B or C. Assuming that two or more stations producing 
the same progrêun type will share the audience equally, it 
is obvious that a fourth channel will also produce a
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program of type A. Only if there were five stations could 
one expect a program of type B to be aired, and at least 48 
stations before type C would appear.
Consider another situation. Assume that broadcasters 
have two programs of equal length available and have broad­
cast time for only one. Also assume that 1000 people would 
pay $1 to see program A, 500 would pay $2, and 2500 would 
watch the program if it were free. For program B, 1000 
would pay $ .75, 800 would pay $1.50, and 2200 would watch 
the program if it were free.
The STV station, like any rational monopolist, would 
run program B for $1.50 to 800 people in order to maximize 
his revenue (given costs). The “free" television station 
would broadcast program A since revenue from advertising 
would be greater given a larger audience.
Program A 
Price Number of Viewers
92 500
1000
2500
Program B
Price Number of Viewers
$1.50
.75
800
1000
2200
40P. 0. Steiner, "Monopoly and Competition in Tele­
vision, " Manchester School of Economic and Social Studies, 
XXIX (May, 1961), pp. 114-115.
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Thus, the majority vote (indirectly determined by 
the rating services) determines what programs will be run 
on commercial television. Programs with the highest 
audience rating are broadcast. STV, however, makes pos­
sible an efficient marketing system which determines a 
price, and dollar bidding replaces voting. Thus a minority 
may outbid a majority and real program diversity will accrue.
One significant by-product that may also accrue as a 
result of STV is actual and not merely nominal competition 
in programing. Past actions of the national networks give 
reason to believe that they will not be willing to sit idly 
by and watch STV capture their audiences. In an effort to 
avoid such audience diversion, the networks will be forced 
to improve the quality of their programing, which would be 
in the public interest. Interestingly, this will not change 
the type of programs offered by the networks since a mass 
audience will remain a necessity on commercial television; 
it will merely serve to improve the quality of existing 
program types. STV as a supplement to commercial television 
will not only increase program diversity and thus be con­
ducive to the existence of a differentiated oligopoly, but 
it will also tend to improve program quality. That increased 
program diversity and quality will tend to accrue without
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government regulation is a significant feature of STV as a 
supplement to commercial television.
Welfare Economics of STV 
Advocating STV is a policy change at the foundations 
of welfare economics since its promotion should imply that 
an increase in the welfare of the community as a whole will 
result. Some criteria must therefore be established to 
evaluate the welfare implications of such a structural 
alteration of the television broadcasting industry and to 
test whether or not the proposed policy change would be an 
improvement. Before discussing these criteria, it is neces­
sary to consider the shape of the transformation curve which 
is assumed.
Let X and Y represent the two goods, free television 
programing and subscription television programing, respec­
tively. The transformation curve for them is indicated in 
Figure 8.
The "full-employment" transformation curve is 
represented by BD. That is, BD shows the maximum amount of 
free programing (OD) or STV programing (OB) or any combina­
tion of the two (along BD) that would exist if the entire 
spectrum allocated to television were being utilized. AE 
represents the transformation curve that would exist if
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no new stations commenced operation. That is, AE represents 
the various combinations of free programing and STV pro­
graming that could exist given the 682 stations currently 
on the air.
Presently, the amount of television programing 
available is represented by OE. If STV stations commence 
operations only on unused channels and no commercial station 
is forced off-the-air solely as a result of STV, the trans­
formation curve will become BCE. That is, STV programing 
could reach the level of OP and there would be no quantita­
tive effect on free programing. Society is better off at 
any point between E and C than at E since it gets as much 
free programing (measured by OE) in addition to subscription 
programing (measured by any point between O and P).
If, however, all STV stations commence operations on 
channels previously occupied by commercial stations, the 
transformation curve will take its usual shape as indicated 
by AE. That is, the amount of free programing will decrease 
as the amount of STV programing increases.
The actual situation is likely to be between these 
two extremes. That is, some STV stations will commence 
operations on unused channels while others will commence
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operations on channels previously occupied by commercial 
stations. As movement along the actual transformation 
curve occurs in a northwest direction (implying an increase 
in STV programing), the slope of the curve will tend to 
decrease. This implies that the rate of increase in the 
quantity of STV programing will be greater than the rate 
of decrease in the quantity of "free" programing, up to 
some limit.
This limit exists because of the FCC ruling which 
allows only one STV station in any area and only in a mar­
ket which is within the grade A service contours of at 
least four other commercial television stations. As indi­
cated in Table 28, only 83 markets meet these requirements. 
Movement to a point on the transformation curve to the left 
of a line such as OF seems unlikely in view of FCC con­
straints on the number of STV stations that will be approved, 
so that the area to the right of line OF contains the rele- 
vcuit segment of the curve for purposes of this analysis of 
welfare.
Given such a transformation curve, four criteria—  
the Pareto criterion, the Kaldor criterion, the Scitovsky 
criterion, and the Bergson criterion— and the theory of the 
consumer surplus can be applied in order to evaluate the
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overall effect on economic welfare of the proposed 
alternative to the current structure of television broad­
casting. It will be shown that a reallocation of resources 
from commercial television to subscription television will 
increase the welfare of society.
41The Pareto Criterion
The Pareto criterion states that a change may be 
regarded as necessarily desirable in terms of economic wel­
fare only if the change benefits someone without injuring 
anyone else. So that it can be compared with the other 
criteria, the Pareto criterion is translated into graphic 
terms.
Assume that in a given market area there are only 
two consumers, A and B, and A derives more utility from free 
television than B. In Figure 9, the utility of A is repre­
sented along the horizontal axis and that of B along the 
vertical cucis. The utility scales of the two individuals 
need not be comparable and it does not matter how this
Vilfredo Pareto, Manuel D* Economie Politique. 1909. 
Reprinted in Alfred N. Page, utility Theory; A Book of 
Readings (New York; John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1968), pp. 
168-181.
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utility is measured. The Pareto criterion states that 
starting from a situation represented by, say, point V, a 
change is an improvement if it results in a move to any 
point to the north, northeast, or east of V. At W, A is 
better off than at V and B is as well off as before. A 
move to X benefits B without harming A, and a move to Y 
benefits both persons.
Since scarce resources in the television broadcasting 
industry imply a concave transformation curve, the movement 
of resources into STV may promote movement of resources out 
of free television. The Pareto criterion does not apply to 
a change that will benefit some and harm others. For exam­
ple, a move from V to Z in Figure 9 cannot be evaluated on 
the basis of the Pareto criterion, for this change increases 
the welfare of B, but it does so at the expense of A,
The Kaldor Criterion^^
In order to evaluate a move such as that from V to 
Z, Kaldor proposed the following criterion. Suppose one 
asks B how much he would pay rather than forego the move 
from V to Z. Call this amount Then ask A how much he
42Nicholas Kaldor, "Welfare Propositions in Econom­
ics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility," Economic 
Journal, XLIX (September, 1939), pp. 549-552.
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would pay to prevent this change. Call this amount 
According to Kaldor, if Mg exceeds B could compensate A 
for his loss in welfare and keep some of the gain 
for himself. Kaldor does not require that A actually be 
compensated, but that B be able to potentially make the com­
pensation out of his gains. Such a change with compensation 
would be an improvement even under the Pareto criterion.
Such a criterion can be graphically demonstrated 
using a utility possibility curve (which assumes a point, 
say E, on the transformation curve). In Figure 10, PP' is 
such a curve indicating the locus of all combinations of 
A's and B's utility levels which can be achieved by a redis­
tribution of wealth between A and B (where this redistribu­
tion is accompanied by no other change). As mentioned 
above, the move from V to Z cannot be evaluated solely by 
the Pareto criterion. But there are points such as T and Ü 
which can be attained from Z by a redistribution of wealth. 
These points lie north, northeast, and east of V. By the 
Kaldor criterion, the move from V to Z is an improvement 
since wealth can be redistributed at Z so that no one loses 
as a result of the change. At points such as T and U, A 
has been compensated for his loss. Any move from point V 
to point Z is an improvement by the Kaldor criterion if and
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only if V lies underneath the utility possibility curve 
through 2, Scitovsky pointed out a weakness in the Kaldor 
criterion.
43The Scitovsky Criterion
A move to point C would imply a different utility 
possibility curve such as QQ' in Figure 11. According to 
the criteria so far established, a ipove from V to any point 
between Z and W could be an improvement.^^ According to 
Scitovsky, a move to a point to the left of Z on the utility 
possibility curve could not be an improvement for A. How­
ever, such a move does not seem likely in view of the rules 
limiting the number of STV stations that could exist to 83 
and only one per market where at least four commercial sta­
tions are in operation. That is, it is assumed that A's 
utility could not decrease enough so that a point to the 
left of Z would become a reality. To avoid such a decline 
in utility is apparently the purpose of the FCC ruling.
Even if the rule did not exist, there is no reason to expect
43Tibor Scitovsky, "A Note on Welfare Propositions 
In Economics, " Review of Economic Studies, IX (November, 
1941), pp. 77-88.
44Movement to a point between W and q ' is not assumed 
to occur since this would imply that the introduction of 
STV had caused a decrease in B's utility.
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conversion from commercial television to STV to an extent 
necessary for the existence of any point to the left of Z 
due to the profitability of network affiliates in each 
market area. This is to say that some point on the trans­
formation curve other than E would result in an improvement 
in the economic welfare of society, and such an improvement 
is given support by rules limiting the number of STV sta­
tions in any market area. C can be regarded as preferred 
to E because it involves a movement to a point such as T, 
which improves the original position of both consumers. 
According to Scitovsky, the change is an improvement if the 
move from E to C is an improvement (according to the Kaldor 
criterion) and if the move from C to E is not an improve­
ment (according to the Kaldor criterion).
The Bergson Criterion^^
Using the three criteria previously established along 
with the Bergson criterion of formulating a set of explicit 
value judgments which enable one to evaluate the situation, 
some conclusions can be made regarding the welfare economics 
of STV. This amounts to the construction of an indifference
45
Abram Bergson, "A Reformulation of Certain Aspects 
of Welfare Economics," Quarterly Journal of Economics, LII 
(February, 1938), pp. 310-334.
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map for society as a whole, or a so-called social welfare 
function, which permits one to judge whether or not a 
policy change is an improvement. This social welfare func­
tion may represent the value judgments of the legislature, 
the economist, the general populace, or (in another eco­
nomic setting) a dictator. For example, a change that moves 
society from point R to point S in Figure 12 is an improve­
ment, since S is on a higher social indifference curve 
than R.
As previously mentioned, there would be a tendency 
for improved quality in programing to accrue as a by-product 
of the more differentiated oligopoly since commercial sta­
tions may otherwise find a significant portion of their 
audience diverting to STV. Such a tendency would tent to 
improve the economic welfare of those who are nonsubscribers 
to STV.
One further point needs to be made. Social welfare 
functions based on democratic decision-making do not always 
exist. A choice was made to apply economic welfare theory 
to the question of whether STV as a supplement to commer­
cial television would be an improvement. There are many 
difficulties in the analysis of decision-making by groups 
wherein the social welfare function depends on the utility
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levels of consumers. Another approach might be to assume 
that the government (or some individual) can assert that 
society is better off in one situation than in another.
The limitations of such a straightforward approach, how­
ever, are obvious.
The Consumer Surplus
Marshall's consumer surplus— the excess over price 
that a consumer would pay for the right to continue to buy 
something that he is now buying— appears to further the sup­
port for STV. How is one to say that a reorganization of 
production, which makes B better off, but A worse off, marks 
an improvement? If B is made so much better off by the 
change that he could compensate B for the loss, and still 
have something left over, then the reorganization is an 
unequivocal improvement.
Assuming that each household viewing a commercial 
program paid the three or four cents that is currently paid 
by advertisers (so that a true demand curve might be con­
structed) , the demand curve for a given program on commer­
cial television would likely be more elastic than the demand 
curve for a program on STV, since closer substitutes exist 
for the former in the form of other commercial stations.
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Given the supply curve, the more inelastic demand curve for 
an STV program (relative to a commercial program) implies 
that the consumer surplus per viewer for the commercial pro­
gram is less than that for the STV program due to the 
existence of close substitutes for the former. This addi­
tional surplus implies that the social cost (the opportunity 
cost) of employing factors in commercial television is 
greater than in STV.
Assuming that factors of production were switched from
commercial television to STV, the loss of consumer surplus
in free television would be less than the gain in consumer
surplus from STV. One could conclude that STV would yield
more benefit to those not adequately being served by free
television than the loss of free time that might occur were
some limited number of resources to be converted to STV.
It is doubtful whether viewers would pay a positive price
46for what they could receive free on another channel, 
while those who are not being catered for on free televi­
sion would be willing (and required) to pay a positive 
price for STV programing. This price is likely to exceed
4-6The consumer surplus on those channels that choose 
to convert would be less than the consumer surplus on those 
that do not, since the latter are likely to be the most 
popular stations.
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what viewers would be willing to pay in order to avoid 
conversion to STV by a commercial station.
CHAPTER V
SUMMARY
In television broadcasting, program diversity is one 
standard by which industry and regulatory performance are 
increasingly evaluated. Program diversity refers to a more 
varied choice within the framework of television programing 
rather than to a quantitative increase in viewer choice 
(i.e., program duplication). Much of the criticism of com­
mercial television focuses on the fact that programing for 
minority tastes has not accompanied the rapid growth of the 
industry.
Since 1952, the television broadcasting industry, 
aided and regulated by the FCC, has become one of the 
fastest growing industries in America. This growth is in 
part a product of the increased fruitfulness of the Americam 
economy. During this period, the number of stations 
increased by more than five hundred per cent, and house­
holds with television sets nearly tripled. At the end of
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1970, the average television household watched television 
over six hours per day.
Between 1952 and 1970, industry revenues increased 
nine-fold, and profits increased over eight-fold. The 
three national networks and 682 individual stations divided 
these increases approximately equally. The industry, which 
employs almost 60,000 persons, has not had an unprofitable 
year in the post-freeze era.
The precedent that advertising would be the chief 
source of revenue for the industry was set by the radio 
broadcasting industry, although many had considered some 
possible undesirable results of commercialized television.
In 1970, advertisers spent a total of $3660 million, or 
18.6 per cent of all advertising expenditures, on televi­
sion alone. Of all media, only newspapers received a larger 
percentage (29.7 per cent) of the advertising dollar, but 
only television has had an increase in this percentage since 
1952. All other media have taken a smaller and smaller 
fraction of the advertising dollar in the post-freeze era.
Since it combines sight and sound, television departs 
from all other means of communication. Herein lies the 
e3q>lanation for television's adverse effect, especially on 
the radio industry, which has e3q>erienced a declining rate
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of growth during the two decades of television. Radio has 
received a smaller and smaller percentage of the advertis­
ing dollar, in part an effect of shorter listening hours and 
thus an increasing cost per thousand to the advertiser, and 
in part due to the lower relative effectiveness of the radio 
commercial. Radio has been placed in a companion role, and 
less attenAon is therefore given to it.
Radio networks have been more affected by television 
than have radio stations. This is because television's 
comparative advantage lies in the programing area that was 
formerly the province of network radio. Individual stations 
have been able to overcome some of the adverse effects by 
shifting to the area of radio's least comparative disadvan­
tage relative to television: recorded music and news.
Attendance, revenues, and therefore the number of 
motion picture theaters have declined since 1952. The fact 
that the population has increased by more than fifty million 
during this period makes the decline even more significant. 
Resource organization, product improvement, and sales to 
television have helped to some extent, but much of the aid 
has gone to motion picture distributors and not to theaters.
The radio and motion picture industries have thus had 
to diver si ^  in order to survive in a world of television.
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but the latter has not been forced to do the same. This is 
a problem that currently exists in the industry from the 
standpoint of television's requirement to serve the public 
interest as dictated in the Communications Act of 1934,
The rapid growth of the television broadcasting 
industry should not be construed to imply that increased 
diversity in programing has also accrued. This fact is 
supported by a recent study which concluded that as the 
number of stations increases, the number of types of pro­
grams available increases at a decreasing rate. Furthermore, 
three-fourths of the viewing is done by 40 per cent of the 
viewers, and an average of 37.3 per cent of the television 
homes do not use television during the prime-time hours. 
Finally, many current viewers feel that they are forced to 
accept a kind of second best. The absence of demsmd prices 
for particular program outputs has left a large portion of 
the population relatively helpless in its efforts to attain 
the type of programing it desires.
Policy efforts of the FCC in recent years have been 
directed toward increasing the level of choice of the pub­
lic. Its means to this end were through increasing the 
number of stations by encouraging the development of UHF 
television, limiting the multiple ownership of stations.
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issuing the Blue Book, and reducing the control of national 
networks over programing by outlawing option time and initi­
ating the prime-time access rule. Such attempts have done 
little to increase the level of choice of the viewer.
The ultra high frequencies (channels 14-83) are both 
technically and structurally inferior to the very high fre­
quencies (channels 2-13). Higher frequencies in the broad­
casting spectrum require more power for a given signal 
strength. The typical UHF station thus has a smaller cover­
age area than the typical VHP station, and UHF has an infer­
ior signal clarity. The vicious circle of UHF broadcasting 
(small audience, few sponsors, lack of revenue, few good 
programs, little reason for people to watch or even purchase 
receivers with UHF tuners, small audience) conditions UHF 
television as a structurally inferior service.
Early proposals to expand UHF television and remove 
its inferior status were either rejected or deemed unwork­
able, impractical, or inconvenient. The all-channel 
receiver law, requiring that all television sets shipped in 
interstate commerce or imported into the United States for 
sale or resale be all-channel receivers, became effective 
April 30, 1964. UHF television has received some aid from 
this law, but UHF expansion appears to be a fruitless means
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of increased program diversity, given audience inertia and 
only three national networks.
The idea that multiple ownership rules will promote 
program diversity is unfounded. Programing is an expensive 
good, and only multiple owners with large amounts of capital 
can engage in such activities to any great extent. The 
relatively superior programing of the national networks (as 
compared to local programing) is a product of their ability 
to effect vertical and horizontal integration, conditions 
prohibited stations to a large extent by the multiple 
ownership rules.
The Blue Book, proposing in 1948 that stations 
present a "balanced program fare, ” was forgotten by 1961 
since indirect station efforts at defining a balanced pro­
gram fare cannot be measured because such a term is vague, 
and the Commission does not have the time nor the resources 
to engage in such detailed studies of community "needs.*' 
Option time, a contract between a network and an 
affiliate whereby the latter promises clearance for network 
programs during specified hours of specified segments of 
the broadcast day, was prohibited in 1963; but there has 
been no noticeeible effect on the amount of network time 
cleared by affiliates. Riding the network is more
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profitable than engaging in local programing, since the 
station must foot at least part of the bill for the latter, 
and network programs are of better quality for a given 
average (per viewer) cost.
The prime-time access rule, providing that no 
television station in the top-fifty markets in which there 
are three or more operating commercial television stations 
may broadcast network programs for a total of more than 
three hours per day between the hours of 6 p.m. and 10 p.m., 
is the most recent effort to reduce the control of networks 
over television programing so that diversity will ensue 
through increased local programing and the rise of a syn­
dication industry. Since a large percentage of television 
homes are unable (or unwilling) to receive four competing 
commercial signals, a fourth network cannot hope to compete 
with existing networks and the high cost of programing pro­
hibits independent stations (as well as affiliated stations) 
from supporting a large syndication industry producing qual­
ity programs of a diverse nature. In most of the markets 
affected by this rule, the result has been thirty minutes of 
inferior programing.
The hypothesis of the study is that program diversity 
in the profit-maximizing television broadcasting industry
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cannot be achieved by government regulation, and that a 
significant improvement in the economic welfare of (actual 
and potential) viewers can be achieved only by complete 
government operation of the industry or by reliance on mar­
ket forces as through subscription television as a supplement 
to commercial television.
Con^lete government operation of the industry implies 
that the government will be allowed to diversi^ programing 
by its own standards of judgment and to supply advertiser- 
supported programing and/or taxpayer supported programing 
at a "zero" price to the viewer. Although such government 
operation may result in a more diversified program fare, it 
is rejected for two reasons. First, it is not in line with 
the philosophy of the economic system prevailing in the 
United States where the role of the government as a supplier 
is limited to markets in which the price system does not 
allocate resources efficiently. Second, there is no eco- . 
nomic criteria (only value judgments) that would allow one 
to decide whether or not the overall effect of such a struc­
tural change would benefit society. More specifically, it 
would be difficult to measure the cost to those who would 
lose programing which they currently enjoy with the benefits 
that would accrue to those (minorities) not currently being
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served. Such an alternative places strong confidence in 
the government and its (value) judgments as to what would 
constitute an improved program fare.
The second alternative, allowing the private (but 
regulated) market to supply free (advertiser-supported) 
television programing and permitting a positive price to be 
set on some television broadcasting, thereby segmenting the 
market for television programs, is accepted as superior to 
the current structure as well as to the first alternative 
of complete government operation for two reasons.
First, STV will provide a more direct and persuasive 
index of the set owner's program preferences them the rating 
services. Second, STV will tend to promote a more differ­
entiated oligopoly through its efficient marketing process.
The fallacies of the television rating services 
prevent them from truly reflecting the demands of viewers. 
The samples used by all the rating services lack randomness. 
Well-known problems arise with telephone calls or personal 
interviews, including interviewer or respondent errors, 
poorly formulated questions, language difficulties, refusals 
to cooperate, and absences from the home. But the most sig­
nificant problem with the present rating process is that the 
number of viewers, not the intensity of want, is relevant.
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What a viewer would be willing to pay (with his dollar votes) 
plays no part in determining what will be broadcast. Votes 
take a value of zero (a non-viewer) or one (a viewer).
STV has a more efficient marketing process since:
(1) only those who view a program will support it and (2) 
in order to maximize profits, STV will show programs which 
the public will pay most to see (with their dollar votes) 
rather than programing which, if free, would be watched by 
the largest number of people.
New commercial stations tend to duplicate the 
programing of rivals as long as the market share they can 
thereby command exceeds what they could otherwise preempt 
with a new program type. The majority vote (indirectly 
determined by the rating services) thus determines what 
programs will be shown on commercial television. STV, how­
ever, makes possible an efficient marketing system which 
determines a price, and dollar bidding replaces voting.
Thus a minority may outbid a majority. If STV exists along 
with commercial television, programs that are not currently 
popular would emerge on the menu with popular ones, thus 
increasing the level of consumer choice by sustaining a 
differentiated oligopoly.
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One significant by-product of STV as a supplement to 
commercial television is that actual (and not merely nomi­
nal) competition in progrcuaing will result in an improvement 
in program quality. STV will be forced to provide diverse 
programs of a high quality since consumers cannot be 
expected to pay for what they currently receive "free." 
However, in an effort to avoid audience diversion, commer­
cial stations and networks will be forced to improve the 
quality of their programing. This will not change the type 
of programs offered by commercial television since a mass 
audience will remain a necessity; it will merely serve to 
improve the quality of existing program types.
STV as a supplement to commercial television will 
thus increase the economic welfare of society by allowing 
television to serve a larger audience. One group (those 
not currently being catered for on commercial television) 
would benefit while injury would not occur to society in 
general. That increased program diversity and quality will 
tend to accrue without direct government regulation is a 
significant feature of subscription television.
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